

**THE
UNIVERSITY LIBRARY
LEEDS**

Classmark


STACK Psychology
A-4 PEA

*The University Library,
Leeds*


Presented by

Miss Warner.

STORE



30106 005550339



AN
ANALYSIS
OF
THE HUMAN MIND.

BY
RICHARD PEARSON.

LONDON:
WILLIAM MACINTOSH, 24, PATERNOSTER ROW.

1863.

LONDON: WILLIAM MACINTOSH,
24, PATERNOSTER-ROW, E.C.

UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY
LEEDS

PREFACE.

THE following brief treatise was written in circumstances so unfavourable that few persons would have undertaken the task. There was, however, no choice between writing it as it is, or leaving it unwritten. I have felt this statement necessary in order to place the work in a proper light, whilst presenting it to the public. The views advanced in the work are not expressed so fully and accurately as the author could have wished, had circumstances supplied a more favourable opportunity. The doctrines contained in the work, rather than the work itself, the author would respectfully submit to the public. Should it receive encouragement, the author will be happy to do what he can to enlarge and perfect it.



CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION	Page 1
------------------------	-----------

CHAPTER I.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL ACTION.

SECTION	I.—Thinking, Feeling, and Retention	5
SECTION	II.—The Senses	5
SECTION	III.—The Mind thinks, without interruption, as long as it is conscious	6
SECTION	IV.—The Mind always under the impression of some Feeling	7
SECTION	V.—Retention uninterrupted as long as the Mind is conscious	8
SECTION	VI.—The Order of Thinking, Retention, and Feeling	9
SECTION	VII.—Thinking dependent on Retention and Feeling	11
SECTION	VIII.—Feeling dependent on Retention and Thinking	13
SECTION	IX.—Retention dependent on Thinking and Feeling	15
SECTION	X.—Mental Action all that can be known of Mind	16
SECTION	XI.—Thinking, Feeling, and Retention essentially dif- ferent in their nature and the object of their action	17
SECTION	XII.—Continuation of the preceding subject	19
SECTION	XIII.—The Object of Thinking twofold	20
SECTION	XIV.—Feeling, its nature considered	22
SECTION	XV.—The Mind cannot by Reflection see its Feelings as it can its Thoughts, which in this case are called Ideas	25
SECTION	XVI.—The Object of Feeling	28
SECTION	XVII.—Nature of Retention	29
SECTION	XVIII.—Use of Retention	30

CHAPTER II.

MODES OF THINKING.

SECTION	I.—General Remarks	32
SECTION	II.—Ideas	33
SECTION	III.—Modes of Thinking continued	34

CHAPTER III.

ATTENTION.

SECTION	I.—Attention—what it is	36
SECTION	II.—Laws which govern Attention	37
SECTION	III.—Laws of Attention continued	38

CHAPTER IV.

REFLECTION AND MEMORY.

SECTION	II.—Use of Reflection	42
SECTION	III.—Varieties of Memory	43
SECTION	IV.—The Thoughts laid up by Memory always connected	45

CHAPTER V.

THE JUDGMENT.

SECTION	II.—Reasoning	48
SECTION	III.—Prejudice	50
SECTION	IV.—Judgment dependent on Memory and Imagination	52
SECTION	V.—Judgment dependent on Exercise	54

CHAPTER VI.

IMAGINATION AND INVENTION.

SECTION	I.—Imagination	56
SECTION	II.—Use of Imagination	57
SECTION	III.—Fancy	59

SECTION	IV.—Invention and Imagination compared	Page	60
SECTION	V.—Nature of Invention		61
SECTION	VI.—Two kinds of Invention		63

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FEELINGS IN GENERAL.

SECTION	I.—Introductory Remarks	66
SECTION	II.—The component Elements of Feeling	67
SECTION	III.—The Elements of Feeling distinct and different according to each Feeling	70
SECTION	IV.—Objections Answered	72
SECTION	V.—Satiety	73
SECTION	VI.—Classification of the Feelings	74
SECTION	VII.—Rule of Classification	76
SECTION	VIII.—Centres of Feeling	77
SECTION	IX.—Classification of Feelings continued	79

CHAPTER VIII.

CONSCIENCE.

SECTION	I.—General Remarks	81
SECTION	II.—Nature of Conscience	81
SECTION	III.—Early Perception of the Rights of Others	85
SECTION	IV.—Conscience—on what it depends	86
SECTION	V.—Power of Conscience	88

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL.

SECTION	I.—General Observations	91
SECTION	II.—Nature of the Will	92
SECTION	III.—Objections Answered	94
SECTION	IV.—Every conscious Act voluntary, in the philosophic sense of the word	96
SECTION	V.—Freedom of the Will	97
SECTION	VI.—Passion and the Will	98

SECTION VII.—Determination of the Will	Page 99
SECTION VIII.—Conditions upon which Strength of Feeling depends	102
SECTION IX.—Strength of Feeling dependent on Exercise of the Feelings	103
SECTION X.—Strength of Feeling modified by Excitability	104
SECTION XI.—The Will modified by the Strength of opposing Feelings	105

CHAPTER X.

TASTE.

SECTION I.—Taste analogous to Conscience	107
SECTION II.—Practical View of the Subject	107

CHAPTER XI.

RETENTION.

SECTION II.—What is essential to Retention	111
SECTION III.—Memory dependent on Retention	113
SECTION IV.—The Understanding dependent on Retention	114
SECTION V.—Consciousness founded on Retention	115

CHAPTER XII.

THEORY OF THE SYSTEM IN HARMONY WITH SCRIPTURE.

SECTION I.—Introductory Remarks	117
SECTION II.—The Understanding and Feelings as treated of in Scripture	119
SECTION III.—The Scriptural View of the Will	120
SECTION IV.—Sanctification	123
SECTION V.—The Conscience	124
CONCLUDING REMARKS	126

INTRODUCTION.

AT first sight, the opinion of the reader may be somewhat prejudiced against the following treatise, by reason of its brevity. He is likely to feel convinced that justice cannot be done to the subject within limits so narrow. And he is the more likely to be confirmed in this opinion by the books which have been written upon the subject, as these are generally very large. But most of the large books on this subject were delivered in the shape of lectures, and others have introduced into them subjects which do not strictly belong to mental science. The principles advanced in the largest works might be condensed into a very small volume, and yet be as intelligible to the reader as in their present shape. The probability is, that to the mere learner, they would be much more so, and that for several reasons. When a subject which has the name of being difficult is presented to the general reader in a great, elaborate volume, it disheartens him in proportion to its extent. If the reader of such a volume has previously studied the subject, his difficulty is not so great. He knows what is irrelevant or of little importance, and passes it accordingly. But the mere learner cannot do this; he searches every corner in the great book with the same stretch of attention. In such a case, it very commonly happens that the learner loses sight of the important points, or gets but a weak impression of them, amid the crowd of quotations, criticisms, examples, and considerations with which the book is made up. Such a course may enlarge the views of those who have mastered the subject, but it is

injurious to the mere learner. If the principles which regulate a language were presented to the student of grammar, as mental science is commonly presented to the student of moral philosophy, little progress would be made in the knowledge of grammar. The same might be said of logic, mechanics, or any other science which, from its nature, can only be intelligibly presented in an organized system of principles and laws. If, in discussing the principles of such a system, a large quantity of incidental matter is introduced, it obscures the connexion between the several parts, and flags the mind of the learner. This mode of treating mental science has given rise to the general impression, that he who would thoroughly master the subject need take nothing else in hand. This impression has been very injurious to the progress of mental science, but it owes its existence to the mode of treating the subject which has been just alluded to. The subject presents, on the face of it, presumptive evidence that a few leading principles, with secondary ones aggregated around them, constitute one organized, harmonious whole. If so, why should these principles not be susceptible of the same clear, brief, and intelligible exposition as those of grammar, or any other well-digested system?

In the perusal of the following brief treatise, the reader is requested to consult his own experience. In doing so, it is necessary, as far as possible, to divest himself of the influence of preconceived opinions. But to do this is a work of great difficulty, and its thorough performance may be said to be impossible in ordinary circumstances. But if one has convinced himself of its difficulty, he has made some progress in the important undertaking. There is no subject which claims a more candid or impartial consideration, than that of mental science, by reason of the variety of conflicting opinions advanced on the subject, and its very unsettled state. This in itself claims a patient hearing for one who has got new views on the subject. When the reader consults his own experience, he should select simple examples, the elements of which may be easily comprehended. If a principle is found true in a simple case, it will be true in one which is compound. But, in a simple case, it is more easily perceived than in one which is more complicated. When the mind becomes familiarized with the working of a principle, it soon perceives it in all its bearings, however complicated these may be. We have already observed that the reader should endeavour to divest himself of the

influence of preconceived opinions. And this especially, in not taking for granted the existence of principles which are not proved. Wherever error has been perpetuated, it has in a great measure owed its existence to this habit. Men fall into this habit chiefly through the influence of example, and yielding to the authority of prominent writers.

The following work differs from preceding works in almost every important point of mental science, so far as the author is aware. The whole difference depends on one original feature in the system, namely, the classification of mental action, and its connexion and dependence. This may be said to be the keystone of mental science. Let mental action be correctly classified, and let its mutual connexion and dependence be determined; and every other important doctrine of the mind may be deduced from it. For example, in the following system, mental action is divided into three classes—thinking, feeling or passion, and retention. If this division be correct, then every sort of mental action must belong to one or other of these classes, if the act be simple, and, if compound, it must be made up of them. The views expressed on the will and conscience, are deduced from the classification already named. It is evident that a true classification must cut at the root every sort of supposititious action ascribed to the mind.

The theory advanced in the following work was completed in all its parts, before the resolution was entertained of proving that it was in harmony with the teaching of Scripture. It will be found to be so by every one acquainted with Scripture, and who may take the trouble of making himself conversant with the views advanced in this work. Nor does it require any far-fetched effort to do this; it harmonizes with the teaching of Scripture with as much ease as if it had been written for the purpose. This has been a source of real gratification to the author; for had he discovered that the views advanced by him in the following system clashed with the teaching of Scripture, he would have felt discouraged. Had that been so, then the system must have been erroneous, or else the teaching of Scripture mistaken by the author. This has hitherto been one of the discordant features of mental science in its religious character. It has been found that almost every system, legitimately carried out, would make void some of the most important doctrines of God's Word. This has tended very much, of late years, to render the subject unpopular

with that class of readers. However startling the exposition of the will and conscience may appear in the following treatise, it harmonizes with the doctrines of man's depravity and regeneration by the Holy Spirit. It is in this department that most of our systems fail in their Scriptural character. The views which they teach respecting the will and conscience, tend to remove any necessity for regeneration, and ignore man's depraved nature. But the moral history of man confirms the teaching of the Bible, whilst it contradicts the plausible teaching of our systems of moral philosophy.

CHAPTER I.

CLASSIFICATION OF MENTAL ACTION.

SECTION I.

Thinking, Feeling, and Retention.

A DEFINITION of the mind is of little consequence: it bears as little relation to an examination of its powers as a definition of the body bears to physiology. But it may be more in keeping with usage to enter on the treatise with a definition.

The human mind is that living principle within each of us which thinks, feels, and is capable in some measure of recording its own actions.

The action of the human mind consists of three distinct elements, namely, thinking, feeling, and retention. These differ essentially from one another in their nature and modes of action; but they are mutually dependent on one another, and are associated in every conscious act of the mind.

SECTION II.

The Senses.

The mind receives all its natural communications from without by means of the senses, which are placed at its service. As to how the mind receives these communications from the senses, nothing can be known, except what physiology has revealed as to the structure of the organs employed for this purpose. The knowledge of such a question is a remote point, for the attaining of which there is not an intermediate step left within reach of the human mind, in its present condition; and therefore every hypothesis which may be created by the imagination, and presented as a revelation of this mystery, can only be re-

garded as a dream. If it were possible to give a truthful solution of this difficulty, it must still be considered without the limits of mental analysis. The same might be said of an endless list of curious questions proposed by writers on this subject. The term Metaphysics, which was irrationally applied to mental science, was made to comprehend every curious question which was incapable of an accurate answer. Hence the origin of mixing up with mental science questions which have no practical or logical connexion with it. The province of mental science is mental action considered as such. An analysis of mental science can only comprehend a classification of the mental powers, with a determination of the laws according to which they act. When mental science leaves behind it mental action, and treats of objects and things which are only material for mental action, then mental science has overstepped its proper boundary. Discussions about time, space, power, genus, species, and questions similar, are out of place in a treatise on mental science. However difficult or easy it may be for the mind to form notions about these, that cannot give them a place among the powers of the mind; they are only objects of mental action, not action itself. According to the same rule of classification, discussions about mathematical axioms might, with equal propriety, be classed with the preceding.

SECTION III.

The Mind thinks, without interruption, as long as it is conscious.

Let the reader, before advancing farther with the work, be convinced, if he can, of the truth of the proposition laid down in the first section, namely, that mental action consists of three elements,—thinking, feeling, and retention. Thinking is used in the common sense of the word. Feeling is to be taken in its widest sense, comprehending all that can be called feeling, emotion, sympathy, and passion. Feeling has been selected in preference to any other term as being more comprehensive. Passion is but a high degree of feeling. Emotion is a term not so much used as passion. When it is used, it is expressive of strong feeling. Sympathy is a particular application of feeling, and is commonly used in a relative sense. Retention is used to express the capability which the mind possesses of recording, in some measure, its own action, or rather, its own

thought. It will perhaps be admitted by every one that, as long as the mind is conscious, it thinks incessantly. If any one should doubt this, let him try, if he can, to arrest his continuous thinking. He will find that when he has placed himself in a position to be disturbed as little as possible by his senses, his mind will turn, in spite of very effort, to reflect or meditate on some subject familiar to it; and, if its action be arrested here, it will glance at some other topic as swift as lightning, or else it will be engaged in thinking of the attempt to stop its own action. By efforts similar to these, he will learn that he cannot arrest thought for a single moment without being unconscious, as in sleep, or in a faint. Passing from one mode of thought to another, the mind, as long as it is conscious, is constantly thinking.

SECTION IV.

The Mind always under the impression of some feeling.

In the first section it is laid down as a principle that feeling is present with the mind as long as the mind is conscious. Those who have not considered the subject may, at first sight, doubt the truth of this statement. For the sake of experiment, let the reader question the statement, and try his own experience. In any of the very stirring incidents of life, he will perceive the presence of strong feeling at first sight. All will admit the constant presence of feeling in these. But it is the cool, calm moments of life that may furnish a doubt as to the uninterrupted presence of feeling in every act of a conscious mind. Let the reader withdraw from every striking incident of life which seems to be prompted by some sort of zeal or strong feeling, and let him take a moment when he withdraws from all business and every active pursuit; then let him reflect on the state of his mind in that moment of retirement, and he will find that feeling of some sort has been present with him. If he withdraws for the sake of making the experiment, then the desire of making that experiment has been present with him, and has kept him there as long as he remained; but if he has done it because he was wearied with his more active pursuits, then the desire of repose and recreation has been present with him. But whilst he is spending this hour of retirement, his mind will be engaged in musing, in reflection, or in reading, or perhaps in

conversation with a friend. But in every case feeling, pleasant or unpleasant, will be present to his mind; and, if his mind is in a healthy state, that feeling will be in proportion to the interest which he takes in the subject of thought. In the ordinary hours of our existence, feelings are so quiet and uniform, that it requires some reflection to determine their presence; and the more so if one is not in the habit of reflecting on such subjects. But reflection will convince the dullest observer that feeling is present with us in every circumstance in which we can be placed.

SECTION V.

Retention uninterrupted as long as the Mind is conscious.

Retention, the third element of mental action, is in constant operation, as long as the mind is conscious. Let it be suspended, and the mind becomes unconscious that moment. We could not have two thoughts connected, however simple, but for it. In the absence of retention, thought would pass through the mind without leaving a trace behind, and would be lost as a stone disappears when cast into the sea. In order to perceive this, it is necessary to consider the subject closely. Suppose one is engaged in counting over twenty articles, in order that he may have an accurate notion of the whole, as a quantity or number. He counts one, two, three, &c., till he comes to twenty. But it is evident, that when he has finished his numerical operation, he can have no notion of the aggregate units that make up the quantity. When counting one, two, he must have completely forgotten on counting two that he had counted one; because no trace whatever remains of it. And as he progresses, the same statement will be true of all the units he has counted at any given point. So that when he counts twenty, the nineteen preceding units have totally disappeared from his mind, and the last shares the same fate as soon as it is named. It will thus be evident, that he is without any notion of the units that make up the whole; and not only so, he must also be without any impression whatever that he has counted the whole. Suppose he has entered into some apartment for the purpose of counting that quantity. Then deprive him, after the same mode, of retention. He will, in consequence, have no notion of the road over which he has just passed, for every trace that it left on the mind was

instantly effaced; as thought passed from one object to another. The same deprivation will prevent him from having any notion of the place from which he set out. And as he is supposed to have set out with the resolution of performing a certain work, that resolution too must have slipped from his mind as the power of retention is supposed to be gone. Therefore, he knows not from what place he came, by what means he has travelled, nor does he know for what purpose he has come, nor anything else about the whole case; that is, he is unconscious. Therefore, as long as one is conscious, retention is in constant operation. When retention is interrupted, consciousness is suspended during the interruption.

Then we take it for granted that thinking, feeling, and retention are present in every conscious act of the mind.

SECTION VI.

Of the Order of Thinking, Retention, and Feeling.

In the three preceding Sections, we have tried to prove, and we hope successfully, that thinking, feeling, and retention are at all times present to the mind, as long as it is conscious. But their action is governed by a certain order.

As long as the mind is in a healthy state, its action proceeds according to a certain order, without any exception or deviation. When any communication is made to the mind by means of the senses, thought comes first in order, retention next, and feeling third. Take as an example, the case of a man reading an account of the loss of some relation. The first element of mental action, called into exercise, is thought, retention follows instantly, and is the passive act of the mind, by which it retains, in some measure, the thought which has been called into exercise by the communication made through the senses. Feeling follows, not from the first impression of thought, but from reflection on the thoughts received. A man reads of the death of his brother. Feeling in this case follows so quickly, that one viewing the mental process but loosely, might be tempted to doubt the accuracy of the last statement, namely, that the thoughts first received into the mind, must in every case be re-looked at, or reflected on, before feeling follows as a consequence. In a case such as this, or that of a mother when she perceives her child in

danger, the connexion between thought and feeling is so intimate and close, that it requires very careful observation to perceive the mental process. But in a case in which the mental process is slower, the order and mode of mental action is more readily perceived. Take the case of one party wounding the feelings of another by some ill-natured remarks. In the first place the thought excited by the offensive expressions must be retained by the mind; and in the second place they must be looked at, or reflected on, before they produce feelings. In describing this mental process, it would appear measured and slow. But in practice, it is commonly as rapid as a glance of the eye. Then thinking, retention, and feeling is the order of mental action. This is the order of action, whether the action depends on information communicated through the senses, or originates in the mind itself, by drawing on the resources of memory, or from reflection, meditation, imagination, &c. This order holds good, however, only in the first opening of any action or enterprise. When the state of the mind is prepared to influence the conduct of the man, this is the order of its awakened action. But when the awakened action of the mind controls the conduct of the man, then he is impelled to action under the influence of some ruling feeling. Then in relation to the conduct of the man, the order of mental action will appear reversed. Feeling, as being the moving power, will come first, and thinking will appear engaged as the servant of feeling, in carrying out its impulse. Retention chronicles the inward workings of the mind, as well as the outward conduct of the man.

Any incident of active life, with a definite beginning, will serve to illustrate the order of mental action, laid down in the preceding, in both its first and second aspect. Let it be the case of a distressed family, brought under the notice of a benevolent lady. Their privations are told to her, and she is moved with compassion. The privations of the family, as they are related to her, first engage her thoughts, retention records them, and makes them part of her social knowledge. She reflects on them, and her sympathy is awakened. But this triple operation of the mind may be only the work of a few moments. This is the first order of mental action. But if her sympathy for the moment, becomes a ruling feeling that is strong enough to overcome other feelings which may stand in the way, then she will be impelled to take measures for the relief of the distressed family. Here then the order of mental action will appear

reversed. Sympathy will be the prime mover, and thought will be employed as its servant in carrying out its bidding. Retention, as usual, lays up events as they occur. Let us glance at the features of the case as they pass through the mind of the benevolent lady. We have supposed her compassion awakened, and become for the time being the ruling passion of her mind. Compassion urges her to active measures. From its pressure she is compelled to think how she can best serve those in distress. She may propose this scheme, then that, weigh and look at both of them in their probable effects, and their fitness to her own circumstances. And when she comes to a decision, as to the mode of bestowing her liberality, thought is in constant exercise in every step of its execution. But every one must perceive here that compassion is the moving power, that thought is employed in carrying out its bidding ; that is, thinking is second in this process of mental action, and in every case retention follows thinking.

Then, as to the order of mental action, it may be laid down as a rule, that thinking, retention, and feeling is the order in the first case ; and feeling, thinking, and retention the order in the second case ; that is, that every process of mental action begins with thinking, and results in awakening feeling. Secondly, when this feeling impels the man to action, it then becomes first in the mental process, and thinking is employed in doing its bidding. This order exists in every course of action. But this order of mental action will be more clearly understood when the will is treated of. Every one is aware that feeling is very frequently excited in the mind without impelling the subject of it to any enterprise : in order to do this, it must be a ruling feeling, that is the will. But this will be treated of in its proper place.

SECTION VII.

Thinking dependent on Retention and Feeling.

We have said that thinking, retention, and feeling are mutually dependent on one another. An exception must be made in the case of thinking. Every natural case of mental action has its origin in some communication made from without by means of the senses. We use the term *senses* as the channel of communication for every impression which the mind receives from its contact with the body.

This includes all the disturbing effects which the mind receives from seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, feeling, with all the natural appetites. The last might be grouped under a sixth sense, called by the name of appetite, or some other appropriate term. In man's present state, the original matter of all mental action comes from without, through the channel of the senses. Thinking is the first mental action excited by the communication of this matter; therefore, thinking originally depends on this source of supply. The information received by the senses becomes matter of thought, and is laid up in the mind to a variable extent. The storing up of this matter in the mind depends on retention and feeling, although thinking itself is the leading agent in the work. But thinking and retention could not lay it up apart from feeling. If feeling, in connexion with the subject of thought, were wanting, the effect of thinking, on the mind, would be as evanescent as the spreading, but vanishing circles formed on the surface of a lake by the falling drops of rain. But, in every intelligent mind, more thought is expended on the materials laid up in the mind than is expended in receiving them originally through the senses. To this extent, therefore, thinking depends on retention and feeling. The material laid up in the mind of an adult, from the earliest stage of infancy, forms in itself a subject of thought as extensive as it is interesting. It is not as a vast accumulation of the memory that it is chiefly interesting. Take away from the mind of any intelligent adult that whole mass of connected and systematized knowledge which memory claims as her own possession, and there will still remain an indefinite, undefined mass of materials, the fragments which memory has been unable to get hold of or classify. These are made up of everything with which the mind has been brought in contact: the knowledge of persons and things, with their qualities, properties, and relations; things social, civil, moral, and religious; things human, and things Divine; the knowledge of words, of human nature, of cause and effect, and of the fixed order and unchanging laws which reign in the physical, the moral, and the social world, of which we are component parts.

From this unsystematized mass of materials, thought, under the modes of invention and imagination, constructs and creates at pleasure, and without end. But it is retention alone which preserves this inexhaustible store of materials, upon which thought turns to

feast, when it is at leisure from more definite work. Therefore, in this extensive department of mental action, thinking depends on retention for the food which sustains it.

But thinking depends on retention, in every exercise of reasoning, in every attempt to classify, and, in short, in every exercise in which two thoughts are either compared or connected. For, as has been proved before, retention must preserve even two simple thoughts, whilst the mind looks at the one and then at the other, either in comparing them, or in considering them as one whole. But for retention, we could not have what writers call an idea—that is, thought considered as the object of thinking. That is the first simple step, when the mind turns to look at its own operations; and, therefore, it is at the foundation of all reasoning and classification, however simple or compound it may be. From what has been said, it will appear that thinking depends on retention and feeling in every case, except when it is excited by the operation of the senses; and then, apart from retention, there could be no connected thinking.

SECTION VIII.

Feeling dependent on Thinking and Retention.

Feeling depends exclusively on thinking and retention; feeling can only be awakened by thinking. To this there is no exception. Let feeling be so calm and gentle, that its existence may be questioned by the ordinary observer, in that state it will be found to be the result of thinking. Let it be the gale of an active, driving zeal, and there, too, it will be the result of thinking. Or, if we search for the origin of that whirlwind of passion that strews its path with acts of violence, we shall be able to trace it to thinking. There is no connected or intelligent thinking but what is attended with feeling of some kind as its consequence. But it has been proved in the preceding section, that we can have no connected thinking but by means of retention. Therefore, as connected thinking is the only means of awakening feeling, and, as connected thinking depends on retention, therefore we have said above, that feeling depends exclusively on thinking and retention. Something must be communicated through the senses, and become matter of thought, in order that

feeling may be awakened; or else it has been previously communicated, laid up in the mind, and is reproduced by reflection. We have used the expression, "connected thinking," that is, thinking in which we compare our ideas, and in some way exercise our judgment. In some cases passion is so violent, and has been awakened so suddenly, that some, thinking over the circumstances superficially, might suppose that there was no exercise of judgment in any sense of the word. But the least attentive consideration will convince every one that, however sudden or violent the passion, there preceded it the exercise of judgment, and that, by that exercise of judgment it was awakened. No one, either in his reason or out of it, has kindled into a passion until he first entertained the conviction that wrong was done to him, either physically or morally. But whether that conviction be right or wrong, rational or irrational, it is the result of judgment. And, though it may not occupy longer time than one could pronounce the shortest sentence, still it is the result of judgment, be that judgment weak or strong. Take the case of two men conversing together in terms of mutual friendship: suppose that G. intends to wound the feelings of T., and, with this motive, makes some ill-natured remark; but it is evident, if T. fails to perceive it, there will be no ill-feeling. On the contrary, friendly feeling will flow on undisturbed. Suppose T. perceives it, but does not consider it important, then it may produce a feeling of coldness. If T. considers it important and ill-natured, anger will be the result; but if T. should consider it of the most extreme character, wholly unprovoked and unmerited, then strong passion will be the result. But, in each of these conditions, feeling is awakened in proportion to the estimate formed by the judgment.

The sustaining and cheerful feeling of hope grows out of thinking. The mind lays hold on some promise, it may be a verbal utterance, a written statement, some fact, circumstance, or law; but the mind must estimate the value of the promise as a pledge, before it can enjoy the healthy feeling of hope. Whatever the feeling may be, thinking must awaken it and sustain it; else, in the absence of congenial thinking, feeling must soon subside and become extinct.

SECTION IX.

Retention dependent on Thinking and Feeling.

That thought cannot be treasured up in the mind without thinking, is self-evident from the terms of the statement ; but that it depends as much on feeling as on thinking, does not perhaps appear so evident to the reader. If we reflect on the incidents of life which are best remembered by us, we shall find in each case the presence of two essential elements. These two elements are concentrated thinking and strong feeling. Concentrated thinking always accompanies a strong degree of feeling, but a strong degree of feeling does not always accompany concentrated thinking. One may remember for a lifetime an incident that was accompanied with a violent fit of anger. But on that occasion there was the most complete concentration of thought. Thinking was engaged with one topic, and that topic was burned into the mind with strong passion. Such an incident will be remembered without the least effort ; indeed, if the party wished to erase it from his mind, he could not do so. The painful experiment has been often made, but it has as often failed. The attempt has only one effect, and that effect is to write it deeper. This is strikingly illustrated by remorse. Every effort that the mind makes to blot out the remembrance of its guilt, has the effect of writing it deeper. This is accounted for by these two principles, concentrated thinking and intense feeling. Every time the mind turns to the painful topic, thinking is concentrated upon it, and this is always accompanied with the strong feeling of regret and guilt, and therefore the impression becomes deeper and deeper. Those sorrowful events which chequer life, are indelibly written on the mind according to the same laws of concentrated thinking and intense feeling. And as in the last example, the mind returns again and again to the painful topic ; and it is by this means that it is impressed, never to be forgotten. Outbursts of joy with thought concentrated on the happy incidents, make the same lasting impressions. Feelings of pleasure, whether they are clean or unclean, act according to the same general law. In the case of the vicious, this is one of the moral difficulties that stand in the way of reformation. And the reformed, in the fight of virtue, has many an agonizing struggle with these invisible foes.

If we reflect on the events and incidents which we most easily

forget, we shall find them such as were accompanied by no discernible feeling, as when the mind wanders from one subject of thought to another, or reads or converses with an easy feeling of indifference. In proportion as one hears a public discourse with pleasure, he remembers it. A schoolboy will commit to memory a lesson in one hour, when he does it with pleasure, but he cannot do as much at another time in two hours, when he has no pleasure in it. In the absence of zealous feeling, thought becomes diffuse; and the more diffuse it is, the less does the mind retain it. In the absence of earnest feeling, thinking cannot be held steadily to the subject of consideration. From what has been said, it will appear to every one who may in the least consider the subject, that retention depends on thinking and feeling, and that its action is the most effective when thinking is simple or concentrated, and feeling strong and earnest.

But there is another aspect of mental action, in which retention is strikingly exhibited as depending on thinking and feeling. Let an incident be passionately impressed on the mind, and it will turn up again and again when the mind is at leisure. The mind, in musing and scattered thinking, is guided by this law. It turns to whatever has been vividly impressed on it at a recent period. Late impressions of a passionate or very earnest character are the attractive points to which thinking retreats for reflective amusement, when it is unyoked from disciplined study.

Hence it will appear that thinking depends on retention and feeling, except when it receives immediate communication from the senses. Feeling depends on thinking and retention, and retention, as has been proved, depends on thinking and feeling.

SECTION X.

Mental Action all that can be known of Mind.

In illustrating the action of the human mind, much of the language used must be understood as figurative; every expression which is founded on the relation of physical bodies, their qualities and actions, must be considered as belonging to this class of language. We can satisfy ourselves, from various modes of conclusive reasoning, that the mind is not material, but spiritual in its nature. Beyond this we cannot penetrate. We can review and consider the action

of the mind, so far as it is recorded by the mind itself. But of the essential nature of the mind we can form no notion. There is no avenue left by which the curious inquirer can make the least progress towards this sacred edifice; not even a crevice, through which he might steal a transitory glance. All that he is in search of is enclosed by a wall of "darkness that may be felt." The nature of mental action is buried in darkness as complete. We can form but an imperfect notion of it, so far as it is recorded by the mind itself. Our relation to a knowledge of the mind may be compared to one whom we can suppose never to have seen the internal mechanism of a clock, nor to know anything whatever of it, but who can, nevertheless, look intelligently at the dial-plate, and read the hours and minutes with accuracy.

SECTION XI.

Thinking, Feeling, and Retention, essentially different in the nature and object of their action.

The object of the preceding section has been to prevent the reader from receiving a wrong impression, by the use of words and illustrations, which must be used in treating of the subject in hand.

Every one must feel, in consulting his own experience, that thinking bears a striking resemblance to seeing. This is so in every exercise of thinking; and from a consciousness of it, language has been gradually conformed to this figurative mode of expression. One party says to another, "Do you see the difference?" and this when the operation of seeing is exclusively a mental operation. Or, again, "Do you see the force of the argument?"

"The mind's eye," is an expression frequently used, both by writers and speakers; and it has evidently come to be so used by the striking resemblance between seeing and thinking. When the mind attempts to consider some subject of thought, its effort resembles that of the eye stretched to view some object. The eye looks at an object on one side, then turns to another; so is it in the operation of thinking. We look at one aspect of a question, then at another, and so on, till we consider it from every point of view; and then, perhaps, take a general view of its bearing. This is what the eye does in viewing a picture. It looks at this feature, then at that one, and again at some third, till it has run through the whole, and then,

perhaps, views it as one picture in judging of its general effect. But this is what the mind does in the consideration of a subject. The mind cannot think of two things at one and the same time, unless it looks at them as one whole, as has been illustrated by the action of the eye in viewing a picture. When the eye looks at the picture as a whole, it is as single and individual as when it looks at one of the many features that compose the picture. The eye can look at an army as one moving or marching whole, or it can fix its gaze on one of the detachments that make up the army; or it can look at one of the companies that compose the detachment; or, coming down to narrower objects, it can concentrate its looks on a single soldier. The operation of thinking is exactly similar, as everyone knows by reflection on his own experience. When one listens attentively to another in relating some incident, the mind looks out from itself to what the speaker says, in a way resembling the exercise of seeing when the eye is directed to some object. This operation of thinking is usually called attention by mental writers. When memory is put to the stretch in endeavouring to call up some forgotten incident, thinking is exercised in a way that very much resembles the action of the eye, when it is directed to the discovery of something which has been lost. Every one must feel this in an effort of memory. The mind, in its exercise of thinking, looks at this, then at that, and again at some other past association; and it does so, like the eye, in quest of the concealed object of search. In that mental exercise, which is called reflection, the mind, in its operation of thinking, looks back on what has previously come under its notice. Thinking in this case is very similar to seeing, in the case of a traveller when he turns and reviews, as far as his eye can enable him, the objects and scenery over which he has passed. Objects at a great distance can only be seen in well defined outline. All that is little and small disappear. Here and there an object stands out more prominently to the eye; so is it in the mental operation. But it is the stretching of the mind's eye, as thinking is called, that resembles the eye of the traveller. The lapse of time flings events behind us in long succession, and the mind turns and gazes back on them like the eye of the traveller over the extended plain that stretches far behind him.

When the mind in its exercise of thinking engages in imaginary conjectures of what is about to happen, or what it is about to do, or when it supposes conditions which it has not actually experienced, in

every such exercise of imagination the mind looks at the picture just as the eye might rest on some untried and unknown region, or as the eye might associate together any number of objects, and look at them as a picture. This is imagination, and it is the same exercise of mental looking as in other modes of thinking.

When the mind compares two propositions, in order to discover the relation which the one bears to the other, it is an exercise of mental looking. The mind looks at the one, then at the other; and then it compares them to see the points of resemblance, and to discover wherein they differ or agree.

The point which we wish to establish from the preceding contrasted comparison is, that thinking is in its nature essentially the same in all its modes of action. Whether it is engaged in receiving information from the senses, or in reviewing that information after it has been laid up in the mind, or whether it is exercised in forming voluntary associations and pictures from the items of that information, or in comparing these items with one another, it is the same sort of mental action. It is the seeing or looking of the mind in every case.

SECTION XII.

Thinking—continued.

It has already been advanced as a property of thinking, that it cannot think of two things at once, except they are considered as one object by the mind. If the reader should doubt the correctness of this statement, he has only to try the experiment of thinking of two things at once, to convince himself that he cannot. However closely they may be associated, yet, if they are presented to the mind as two objects, and not one, the mind, in its attempt to think of both at the same time, will think of the one, then of the other, and so on, as long as the experiment may be tried. Thinking is superficial, and leaves little impression, in proportion as it is rapidly directed from one subject to another. It is comprehensive and penetrating, in proportion as it is concentrated on a single subject.

However much the mind may be concentrated on one object of thought, thinking, in any case, is but a succession of thoughts. It lasts but a moment, and is repeated again and again, even when it is concentrated on one subject of thought. Its interruptions may be

compared to the interruptions of seeing by the twinkling of the eye. The comparison is not accurate, but it comes nearer than any other that we know. Let the reader take some simple case and apply his mind to it, and he will be able to realize the truth of what has been asserted. Let him take an object which engages his eye, but which presents no change, and let him fix his thoughts on it, and see if thinking will remain uninterrupted longer than a moment. If he will take some subject of reflection, he will experience the same difficulty in holding his mind in unbroken thought longer than a moment. If the power of thinking had been otherwise constituted, it would not have answered the end it was intended to serve. If thinking in its natural exercise had been capable of lingering unbroken on a single topic, it would have been too sluggish and slow to serve man in guiding him amid the complicated and ever-varying circumstances with which his course is interwoven. To serve the purpose of his preservation and safety, it must, like the eye, be capable of rapid movement. This has not been left in the power of man to regulate, but the wise Author of our being has imparted to it a constitution suitable to the circumstances in which man was intended to be placed. It may be observed, that whatever is absolutely necessary to man's existence and preservation, the Creator has bestowed on him, in a way which places it beyond his neglect, except he does violence to his own being.

SECTION XIII.

The Object of Thinking.

This subject must be taken up and treated more largely in the following chapter. Here we may observe that the object of thinking is twofold. The first is to take a general survey of the circumstances in which the individual is placed; the second, to guide in the execution of every particular enterprise in which he engages. The rapidity with which thinking performs its work fits it for the harmonious discharge of this twofold function. But for the first, man would not pursue an intelligent course through life; and, only for the second, the course marked out intelligently would remain unexecuted. The mind, in its ever-active, discursive thinking, looking about in all directions, keeps a keen look-out on all the circumstances with which

the individual stands connected. This it does by receiving information from the senses; by reflection, musing, meditating; by drawing imaginary pictures, and then comparing and deducing inferences from them; and by comparing and judging facts according to fixed principles and laws. Questions which interest the safety and happiness of the individual are determined. From these deliberations feelings are awakened which either urge on their subject to certain courses of action, or repel him from undertakings which he deems unsafe or contrary to his principles of happiness. Man's active course thus exhibits a twofold aspect. On the one hand he is in pursuit of certain circumstances in contact with which he wishes to place himself. On the other, he is as diligently engaged in shunning the contact of certain circumstances, which he believes are unsuitable to his happiness, according to the rules of judging which he entertains on this subject. From this double course of action which man pursues, he is supplied with a double class of feelings, the one impelling, and the other repelling. The one class impel him onward in certain courses, but it is thinking which must guide in the execution of the undertaking to which feeling impels him. When feeling is repelling, thinking must guide in threading out the way which would keep clear of that which is detested. Thinking thus performs a double function: first, in awakening feeling by deliberating on the circumstances in which we are placed; and, second, in guiding the impulse of feeling in the execution of its bidding. Take an example. Suppose one in the usual discharge of his duty, but with his thoughts actively alive to what is passing around him, discovers that he is about to be overtaken by some sudden danger. A fear of consequences will evidently be the result; but this feeling of fear has been produced by the agency of his thinking powers. This fear will in turn urge him to adopt measures of security. Here thinking will come in to serve in carrying out the impulse of feeling. This is thinking in its twofold office, namely, by its exercise in first awakening feeling; and, second, when feeling is awakened in executing its commands. The individual who supposes himself to be in danger would not adopt any precautionary measures unless urged by a feeling of danger. But this feeling of danger would urge him in vain, if thought was wanting to point out the proper steps to be pursued. Suppose, whilst the individual in danger is making all speed to escape, his thoughts are actively engaged in attending to all

that is needful for dispatch: yet thought, from its quickness, is able, in the most pressing emergencies, to cast a glance around it. Suppose, in these circumstances, he suddenly discovers that all the causes of fear were founded on mistake, and that there is no occasion whatever for the least misgiving: fear will be extinguished, and with its cessation all the measures he had adopted at its bidding will be given up. A feeling of security will succeed. This feeling will urge him to return to his former position, nothing else hindering. But thinking will be at the service of this feeling, just as it was at the service of the opposite one, as long as it was in power. Thus it will be seen that thinking performs the twofold office of awakening feeling, which urges to action; and, second, in serving that feeling in carrying out its bidding.

SECTION XIV.

Feeling : its Nature Considered.

When feeling is intense, it is called passion. Passion, from its derivation, conveys the idea of suffering. A common impression runs through the minds of people that the subject of strong feeling suffers. This is generally true, whether the passion be pleasant or unpleasant in its nature. In the most agreeable passions the effect is to fatigue, to wear out the energy of the mind, and to exhaust and sink it below its ordinary measure of vigour and animation. But the effect of the opposite class of passions is far more destructive, such as remorse, grief, anger, revenge, &c. From the effects of these the mind suffers in the fullest sense of the word. The effect of these passions tends to destroy the healthy state of the mind, if prolonged beyond a limited period. They are only intended for special occasions, and provision is made for setting a limit to their period of power in the exhausting effect which they produce. In ordinary minds this checks their power, and sets the mind at liberty from their influence. But it is from this suffering effect that strong feeling is called passion. The mind becomes a wreck under the effect of strong passion if unduly indulged.

The feelings are called emotions from the stirring and moving effects which they produce. The term is generally not used in the

sense of passion. It is for the most part used by both writers and speakers in a sort of pleasant and agreeable sense, and expresses a degree of moderate passion.

The term *feeling*, as applied to mental action, is expressive of that class which is awakened by thinking, and impels, or tends to impel, the man to action, or restrain him from it. The term as applied to the mind, is borrowed from the sense of feeling. This appears to have occurred from the striking points of resemblance between feeling as a sense of the body, and feeling as an action of the mind. There is a contrast similar to that which exists between thinking and seeing. The same observations might be repeated here as were made when thinking was compared with seeing. The design of the observations alluded to was to guard the reader against any misconception of the nature of mental action by the use of figurative language. Feeling, as a sense, is either pleasant or unpleasant. So is the feeling of the mind; it is either pleasant or unpleasant. The one resembles the other in its measure of duration. The sense of feeling conveys several sensations at one and the same time, as heat and cold. Several feelings exert their influence on the mind at one and the same time, as those of anger and grief.

We may compare feeling as a class of mental action with thinking. Feeling follows in the wake of thinking. It has a beginning, an increase, a decrease, and an end. Thinking, however long continued in connexion with the same subject, is but a repetition of momentary action. Feeling varies in degree, but has no cessation till it ends. As to the time of thinking, it may be compared to that of a series of impulses; and as to the time occupied by feeling, it may be compared to that of a pressure. The mind can only be engaged with one thought at once; but several feelings mingle their influence at one and the same time. The more intense feeling becomes, thinking becomes the more earnest and concentrated. This is so in all the ordinary business of life. But there are subjects, such as mathematics, which exercise thinking in a way the most concentrated and intense; yet there is present only an ordinary state of zeal. When the course of thinking which awakens feeling is ended, feeling ends with it; but if circumstances remain the same, the feeling will awake to power and life upon the thoughts returning to the subject which previously called it into power. The more frequently it is thus called into exercise, the more easily is it kindled into power. There is a striking exception

to this rule in the case of some feelings. This exception will be considered in the proper place when the several kinds or modes of feeling are treated of.

Let us take examples to illustrate the several principles laid down. In many cases the mind is under the influence of two or more feelings at the same time. Suppose a wife hears of her husband's safe return from a voyage, but had heard some time before that he had perished in a storm. Taking it for granted that their attachment was all that could be desired, she is suddenly moved with a transport of joy. This happy passion will rise and swell with every sentence of the letter which she reads. An opportunity is earnestly sought, and joyfully obtained, of setting out to meet him. Her thoughts are pleasantly engaged in an exercise of imagination on their happy meeting; she is thinking of what she will tell him about the tears she shed on hearing of the sad report that reached her, or perhaps she is inventing jokes about what she would have done, in order to give zest to the imaginary scene which is fast approaching. Real, genuine joy, uninterrupted and continuous, lights up her countenance with its happy sunshine as she feasts on her imagination. Her little son accompanies her on the journey to meet his father. And as our brief moments of happiness are seldom without alloy, he is run over and has some of his bones broken. Here every thought of the mother is intensely directed to the condition of her little son. Her joy for a time is extinguished, and it is succeeded by the chill feelings of fear, disappointment, and grief. The tenderness of a mother yearns over her helpless child, and she weeps to relieve the depression of her nerves. On first hearing of her husband's safety, joy bursts out instantly. With her the passion of joy is uninterrupted. Whatever may be the variety of her thinking, her strong happy feeling does not for a moment forsake her. She may in the meantime be engaged in some domestic exercises, which may to some extent claim her attention before she sets out as supposed in the preceding, but her mind is constantly under the influence of the passion which has been excited. Her son, however, meets with a sad misfortune. This for a time engages all her thoughts, and feeling is excited suitable to the circumstances of the case. But having attended to her son's necessity, her thoughts are again directed to her husband's return. But the state of her feeling is not now what it was, it is not the untainted flush of joy. Her happy feeling has mixed with it an alloy,

and that alloy is a feeling of sorrow and regret from the thought of the accident that has overtaken her son. That is, there are present in her mind two feelings, mixed up just as the circumstances are mixed that produced them. Joy is repressed and modified by the presence of sorrow. And sorrow is moderated by the counteracting influence of joy. Neither passion is what each would be in the absence of the other. But as both occasions pass by, and the mind becomes engaged with the concerns of every-day life, in its ceaseless moving stream of events, both passions entirely disappear, and cease to exercise any influence whatever on the mind. When the thoughts return to the occasion in an exercise of reflection, a shade of gladness or a sting of regret may be felt, as thought touches each of these interesting items of past life.

SECTION XV.

The Mind cannot by Reflection see its Feelings as it can its Thoughts which in this case are called Ideas.

When some incident engages our thoughts, we can reflect on it after the occasion has long passed away. By the help of memory we can go back and look at the original subjects as we first saw them, but not so vividly. We cannot do this with our feelings. They are of a more subtile nature. We perceive them as a moving influence, but the mind cannot look at them as it does at a thought or idea. We can look at the circumstances and conditions which give rise to certain feelings or which modify and extinguish them. In ordinary circumstances we can pronounce with certainty on the laws which govern and direct our feelings, and the effect which certain feelings produce. We know that a happy or successful event produces that feeling which we call joy; that the opposite produces sorrow, that an unprovoked injury intentionally inflicted begets commonly a feeling which we call anger. These are conditions alike known to all. We remember with ease the effect which a passion produces on us; and we remember it the better the more intense or violent it has been. We can remember the effect produced upon our spirits, and the strain which was brought to bear on our nerves. We can remember the pain which we endured or the pleasure which we enjoyed from the presence of feeling. But when we bring our minds to examine

the subject closely, we find that we can remember the passion only as it influenced our thoughts ; that is, we can form no conception of the passion itself, only as we felt it a power operating on us in impelling us to action either directly or indirectly. We feel it an influence which comes through the action of thought, but we cannot see it as we see our thoughts. When awakened, it intensifies thinking and directs it, when the feeling has gained the mastery of the mind.

Take any case of passion and consider it attentively, noting carefully how we view it ; what are the features which impress themselves on our minds, and which we call up again by memory ? Suppose a family entirely depending upon funds deposited in a bank, hears all of a sudden that the bank has failed. The feelings awakened are likely to be despondency, grief, and anger. But how will the whole affair appear to one of the injured parties on reviewing it ? He will be able to remember with what a piercing and penetrating power the sentence entered his ears, that the bank had failed. He will be able to remember, too, the cold, nervous feeling suddenly taking hold of his system, or the blood suddenly rushing to his face. He may be able to recall the confusion of his thoughts on first hearing the news, or his kindling anger after a few moments' deliberation ; then the resolutions which he made, and the proceedings in which he engaged, with some of the most prominent things which exercised his attention. But beyond these effects of his passion he can remember nothing. He cannot by any effort of the mind see his passion, as he can look back at his desponding or burning thoughts. He remembers how his nerves were affected, and the chill which fell on his spirits. But these had all become matter for thought, and as such he can remember them. His passions were expended in the influence which they imparted to his thoughts, and thence the effect produced upon his whole man. It was deep feeling which, kindled at once, made every word of the important utterance, of the broken bank, penetrate his moral being to the quick. But this is all that remains of the passion, though viewed the next moment. It does not record itself in the mind apart from thought. It takes hold of thought, intensifies it, and burns it into the soul, if we may use a figure. According to the office which it was intended to discharge, it yields the mind pleasure or pain, and thus stirs and prompts it on to active measures, for this appears to be its primary end. Take the case of a man under sentence of death awaiting his execution, but who on application

receives a reprieve from the Crown. He awaits the return under the pressure of two feelings, alternately contending for the exclusive possession. When that message arrives, every word of it penetrates to his inmost soul. But it is the feeling which burns with the utterance of the first sentence that renders every word an arrow piercing to the heart. Let the condemned culprit be completely seared and deprived of all feeling, and he receives the message for life, or death, with the same indifference. The sentence has in it no arrow more than if one of the officials had announced his readiness to supply him with a meal. In the one case the message makes an impression so vivid that, should life be prolonged for half-a-century, whenever it is called up by memory it appears to lose none of its vivid freshness. In the other, it is merely remembered as one might do the most common-place thing. When the subject of the first case looks back, he can remember nothing but what was a subject of thought. He remembers the effect which the announcement made on his spirits, what were his thoughts and feelings. His feelings he remembers only as they gave direction and influence to his thoughts and made him feel happy or unhappy. He cannot look at the feeling itself as an impression left behind in the mind, as we can look at our thoughts. If he can trace it he perceives that it is only an influence resting on thought giving direction and complexion to it. He feels its effect on his thoughts, and thence on his nerves and system. This is all the trace that remains of passion. It may therefore be said that retention does not lay up feeling as it does thought. But as it gives direction, complexion and colour, to use figurative language, to our thoughts, under that aspect it is retained as thought is retained. It may be added that thought is retained in proportion as it is influenced by earnest feeling or strong passion. It has been proved in a previous section that thought would not leave any permanent trace behind but for feeling.

Feeling, in its nature, will appear to be an influence awakened by thinking, and when awakened, its influence takes hold of thought itself, giving it direction, complexion and colour, as it has already been expressed; that is, our thoughts are set to work at the urgent demand of the ruling feeling, and they have complexion and colour, using an expressive figure. They are thus thoughts of anger, thoughts of grief, thoughts of joy, or of some other feeling of an impassioned complexion, as hope, fear, revenge, &c. And thus it is

that they affect the happiness of the whole man, the body suffering as the mind suffers, or being comfortable as the mind is happy.

SECTION XVI.

The Design or End which Feeling is intended to serve.

As this subject is to be treated more largely in one of the following divisions of the work, it requires here but a few observations for the sake of order.

It may be observed of the faculties with which the mind is endowed, that each one is intended to serve some useful and specific purpose in the discharge of those duties which devolve on man as a rational and accountable being. The organs with which his body is supplied serve the end of his preservation and enjoyment, but not less so the faculties of his mind. The former are but the mechanical instruments; the latter supply the wisdom that plans, and the energy that executes: both, in a remarkable degree, display the wisdom and skill of the great Architect.

Feeling is the mental power which impels to action. This, directly or indirectly, is the office of feeling. Whatever direction thought might take, the man would remain inactive but for feeling. His neighbour might inflict the most unprovoked and ruinous injury upon him, without his making the least effort to avert it, or taking measures for his own safety. Anger must quicken him to action, and give it aim and direction. Cases the most touching and affecting would appeal in vain to his benevolence and sympathy; if there was not a trace of such feelings in his soul, he would not move himself. The attraction and power of friendship would exercise no influence on him, as he had no feeling in connexion with it. The same would be true of his patriotism, or of any other relationship, as that of parent, brother, friend, neighbour, &c. But, to come down to animal appetites, it is only through feeling that their demands are attended to.

But as this subject is to be taken up when the different modes or kinds of feeling are treated of, more need not be said at present.

SECTION XVII.

Of the Nature of Retention.

Retention differs altogether in the nature of its action from thinking and feeling. The mind is conscious of its thinking, and it is equally so of its feeling; but it cannot perceive retention in any sense; it only infers it; it does not in any sense feel or perceive it. But its existence is no less certain than that of thinking or feeling. Let the reader make an experiment, and watch closely the operations of his own mind. Let him take up a newspaper, and read over some paragraph which may prove an interesting and ready exercise for memory; it may be the tragic details of some murder. His thoughts are closely exercised in attending to the several circumstances of the dark deed; and, in proportion to his sensibility, he will be exercised with feeling. These two classes of mental action he will be able to observe, but no other. However carefully he may note the movements of his mind, he will fail to detect any other action. He has laid aside his paper, and a neighbour asks him in conversation about the supposed murder. He readily tells over to him all the particulars. How were these written down in his mind? It is beyond doubt that, as he read, that work was performed in the mind, although he could not observe it, as he could his thoughts, or as he could his feelings. It is only afterwards that he discovers that a work is done, the doing of which he could not observe. It is after a train of thought has passed through the mind that he is able to infer that retention was doing its work although it was out of sight.

From this view of retention, it must be considered as a passive action when compared with thinking and feeling. There are two elements connected with this action: there is, first, the capability which the mind possesses of retaining thought; and, secondly, there is the united agency of thinking and feeling necessary to the successful performance of retention. A very little observation will convince any one of the existence of these two elements in every act of retention. If the united effect of thinking and feeling were the only element in laying up thought, then, wherever these were alike intense, the same or equal effects would follow. But this is not so. Examples may everywhere be met with to prove that, whilst two persons

may think and feel alike intensely, the one remembers much better than the other. But, then, if retention altogether depended on thinking and feeling, the results in the supposed case would be equal. Therefore retention does not depend on thinking and feeling alone.

With equal ease it may be proved that it does not depend on the mind, apart from the agency of thinking and feeling. When thought is concentrated and earnest it leaves the more lasting impression behind; when it is scattered and discursive, and accompanied with little feeling, it does not leave one lasting thought behind. This is strikingly illustrated by two boys committing to memory a school exercise. The capacity of both is equal; but the one goes to his work with a cheerful eager desire to perform it, the other is under the influence of a careless aversion, with feelings impelling him in some other direction. The one gets his lesson fast, and with ease and comfort, and retains it; the other tries hard, apparently, and almost agonizes in his struggles to get through. He does not know the reason himself, but it is simply the want of a keen harmonious feeling urging him in the direction of performing the prescribed task.

From this view of the subject, it may be seen with readiness, that these two elements are necessary to retention—that is, first, the capability of the mind to receive the impression, and, secondly, the agency of thinking and feeling united in producing that impression.

SECTION XVIII.

Of the Use of Retention.

Retention may be called the basis of all other mental action. All that is called knowledge depends upon it. It has been proved, in one of the preceding sections, that, independent of it, two thoughts could not be connected nor compared. And as feeling, in all its degrees, depends on the action of thinking, consequently there could be no feeling but for retention. For, however quickly feeling may appear, on some occasions, to follow the thoughts which produce it, yet in every case there is a comparison of thoughts, or, in other words, there is a judgment pronounced by the mind. But, however concise or brief the judgment may be, there is, in every case, a com-

parison instituted. This comparison depends on retention. But there can be no feeling but when a judgment is mentally pronounced. So that feeling, of every mode or class, and of every degree, depends on retention. And, if both thinking and feeling depend on retention, then retention is the basis of all mental action.

Suppose a case for illustration. A man gets grossly insulted by his neighbour, without the least provocation, and, let his temperament be one of the most excitable, passion appears to follow instantaneously. And some one not in the habit of thinking closely and carefully may be ready to ask, Is it possible that the injured party has time, not only to think, but to pronounce a judgment, and then that feeling in the shape of fierce anger follows, and all this in what appears but a moment? We answer, yes; whether words are audibly pronounced or not, in every case some such sentence as the following is silently uttered: "That is most cruel; that is wicked; that is truly malicious," &c.; such are, in every case, the thoughts that pass through the mind, whether a word be uttered or not. But in every such sentence there is a judgment pronounced. In that judgment there is the agent who commits the offence, there is the act, or offence. And that act is compared with the circumstances of the whole case, and it is pronounced to be cruel, unprovoked, and unjust; and anger is the result. Such is the rapidity of mental action, and especially that action to which the mind has been long trained, that such a process of thought passes with the rapidity of lightning. But it has been clearly proved in another place that two of these thoughts could not be connected but for retention. And it has also been proved that feeling in no case can be produced but by the exercise of judgment, be that judgment right or wrong, sane or insane. This subject is treated more largely in a subsequent chapter.

CHAPTER II.

MODES OF THINKING.

SECTION I.

General Remarks.

FOR the sake of convenience in the use of terms, understanding, when used in the following work, will be taken as synonymous with thinking. When thinking is spoken of as the "mind's eye," then it is used in the same sense as when thinking is expressed by the term understanding. When we say that we understand a thing, we mean that we see its connexion and bearing. The term perception is frequently used in the same sense; so that in the use of language, to understand a thing, to perceive it, to see it, all three convey, in a general sense, the same meaning.

The term understanding is commonly used to express thinking only when it is exercised in a reasoning process. In an extended sense all thinking may be considered as reasoning. There is a process of comparison and deduction in everything that the mind does in its exercise of thinking. But we must consider this only in a free sense. For there is no term so expressive of thinking in all its modes as seeing. Thinking is mental seeing. When the mind thinks, it looks. It looks through the senses for information from without. It stores up the information which it receives from the senses by retention. And, as it suits its purpose, it returns to these stores of information, in an exercise which is called by the name of memory, or reflection. In this exercise it does not look out through the senses, it looks within. When we say the mind looks within, the expression is not descriptive of the action as every one consciously feels it. When it is an exercise of memory, the mind seems to run

back and place itself in the original position in which it received the information from the senses. But the representation is always dim and obscure compared with the original itself. The exercise of thinking is, in this, the same looking or seeing faculty as it was when it looked out through the senses.

SECTION II.

Ideas.

When the mind looks back, in an exercise of memory or reflection, to scenes that are gone, it sees them but dimly compared with the original, when the mind viewed them through the senses. Retention enables the mind to lay up the thoughts communicated to it through the senses. We have proved in the preceding chapter, that were it not for this we could have no feeling and no intelligible thinking whatever. As to how the mind, by its power of retention, does this, we need not inquire, as there is no possible means of discovering it. We might as reasonably inquire into the nature of mind itself, apart from its action. But mental writers have laid hold of this feature, which, in common with many other elementary features of mental action, is in itself of little consequence. Yet they have built systems upon it, leaving the harmonious action of the mind almost untouched and unexplained. The thoughts laid up or retained in the mind when re-considered in an exercise of reflection or memory, they have called ideas. According to them, thought, when it is the object of thinking, is called an idea, whether this be one's own thoughts, or thoughts communicated from one to another. It has been called an idea, because it was considered as a sort of picture of the original thought received through the senses. This was the point of wandering. Having made the thought laid up in the mind by its faculty of retention a picture, they clothed it with attributes as it suited their fancy. They assigned it an independent existence, or destroyed it at pleasure. Amid the convulsions of wandering, some made it the basis of all existence, and others used it with more than magical effect in reducing the universe to a dead chaos,—but in reality producing no other effect than to prove, that a man endued with great and immortal powers of mind may, by wandering into an illegitimate path, sink himself below the standing of a rational being.

The term *idea* has come to be used as one of the commonest words in the language. It is, in a general way, used for thought. The useless and absurd theories built upon it greatly obstructed the progress of mental science.

SECTION III.

Modes of Thinking.

Modes of thinking are the same as faculties of the understanding. Thinking is essentially the same mental action in every case; but the work which it does in one case is very different from what it does in another. Its division into modes depends on this difference. Faculties of the understanding are considered as synonymous with modes of thinking, because the understanding is considered the same as thinking. Although thinking is essentially the same in every mode, yet each mode is not only distinguished from every other by the nature of the work which is done, but there is a sort of natural distinction. The evidence of this natural distinction is to be found in the fact that one individual differs from another in the capacity which he exhibits under each mode of thinking. One excels in the accuracy and acuteness of his judgment, yet has nothing to boast of in the fertility of his imagination. Another is deficient in soundness of judgment, but boundless in the resources of his imagination. A third is as remarkable for the strength and readiness of his memory, as he is for the deficiency of his judgment and the sterility of his imagination. A fourth excels in the faculty of invention, who is not remarkable for any other intellectual capacity. These natural distinctions may be observed everywhere; and they are as much the foundation of the division of thinking into modes, as is the different nature of the work performed under each faculty or mode. It may be observed that the important doctrines of the mind are in no way affected by a perfect or imperfect division of the modes of thinking. A correct division contributes to the accuracy of language, and leads the learner to think correctly on the subject. It is hoped the following division will satisfy these conditions.

When thinking is engaged in receiving information from the senses, it is called attention. Thinking is called reflection, when it is engaged in reviewing the information which it has received from

the senses. When thinking is engaged in comparing the items of information received, its work is called judging; and thinking, thus employed, is called the judgment.

When thinking is exercised in putting together the items of information which it has received so as to form a picture, in this case thinking is called the imagination.

When thinking constructs a picture, not at will, but to satisfy certain definite conditions, then in this case thinking is called invention.

When thinking is exercised in calling up information in the order in which it was originally received, or in telling over the operations of the mind, then in this case thinking is called memory.

We have, then, these six divisions of thinking, or the understanding, namely, attention, reflection, judgment, imagination, invention, and memory.

CHAPTER III.

ATTENTION.

SECTION I.

Attention—what it is.

IN the common exercises of the mind, the modes of thinking are so mixed up that it is not easy at all times to distinguish them. Attention is spoken of more vaguely than any other mode of thinking. The word is applied frequently to express the perseverance of the mind in any special work ; as, he *attends* to his books, or he does not attend. Attention applies properly to thinking when it is engaged in receiving information from the senses, or when it observes the operations of the mind. Its place, among other mental operations, would appear to be, first, in receiving information from the senses ; and second, in every case in which the mind applies itself to the consideration of some prescribed work. And when the mind is not thus engaged, it falls back into a resting or relaxed position, which is called reverie. In this exercise the mind rests, and the term attention cannot be applied. When the mind comes out of its state of reverie, attention is applicable ; for it does not come out till it is to attend to some definite, prescribed work, or else to listen to the communication of some sense. The mind then leaves its posture of rest, and assumes one of labour. Then the limits of attention as a mode of thinking would seem to be simply in attending to the report of the senses, and in turning from one mental state to discharge the duties of another.

SECTION II.

The Laws which regulate Attention.

The practical part of this subject is to determine the laws which regulate attention. How is it that the mind leaves off its prescribed task unfinished, and rambles to another subject, or to listen to something attractive from the senses? In order to answer these queries, and make out a general law, the disturbing causes must be determined, and what they depend upon. Attention is under the control of the will, but this afterwards will be proved to be the ruling feeling or feelings. Attention obeys the ruling feeling. Take an example. A student is engaged in the study of some scientific subject, but he fails in his efforts to fix his attention on it, and so prosecute it with diligence. Suppose he enjoys good health, and is in no way deficient in mental capacity; yet, as often as he turns to the subject, his mind wanders off to another, which seems, by intruding into every subject in which he engages, to underlie the whole of his concerns. If he examines this troublesome visitor, he will discover that it is something which has worked itself deeply into his feelings; something with which he is passionately taken up. Its influence is too intense to be withstood by any other consideration. If we may use the expression, it lies burning at the bottom of his mind, and withers the influence of every other engagement. That concern, whatever it may be, which is most passionately impressed on the mind is, for the time being, the natural centre of thinking. It ceases to engage the thoughts only by lassitude, or when the thoughts are centred on some other subject by the influence of some stronger feeling, or when they are called away by some impression produced on the senses. It follows from this that the attention is subject to the control of three different influences. These are as follow:—First, attacks from the senses; second, lassitude; and third, the influence of some subject with which the mind is passionately taken up. It follows that when the mind engages in the consideration of a subject it will not leave it, if time permit, till the prescribed task is performed, unless disturbed by one or all of the three disturbing causes enumerated above. Lassitude comprehends not only legitimate fatigue from protracted labour and application, but that easy sluggishness which marks so

conspicuously the application of some compared with others. The attention cannot be kept up when the mind becomes exhausted by long application, or by intense application for a short time. The mind then turns to some fresh subject, or falls back into its natural resting condition. This natural resting condition, as mentioned before, is reverie. Here the mind cools down from intense feeling, and its powers of thinking gain strength by relaxation.

In a state of reverie attention has gone out of office. The powers of the mind are like schoolboys let out to play,—they only do what they cannot help, and that for amusement. At one time they are playing with the senses, at another they are gathering flowers of imagination. Now they wander amid the landscapes of former days, and then leave them like winged lightning, and play with newer scenes. Such an exercise cools the mind from the feverish excitement of overwork and intense application. The feelings regain their temperate capabilities, and the powers of thinking their clear, steady penetration.

SECTION III.

The Laws of Attention continued.

In the second place, attention may be disturbed by the senses. From this quarter some consideration may be forced upon the mind which will draw it off from its engagement, however intensely it may be pursuing its task. This is a wise provision for discharging what may be the important duty of the moment. It is its abuse that requires the firm resistance of the will in urging attention to do its duty. The interruptions of attention from this quarter cannot be considered of much importance when health is good. If the person is placed in circumstances so as to be annoyed, either by the eye or ear, habit does a great deal in removing this in a short time. A stranger, on first coming into one of our crowded thoroughfares, is confused with the rumbling, rolling, grating noise. But a short time of exercise brings him to be able to muse and meditate, as if he enjoyed the accommodation of some sequestered vale.

But the third disturbing cause is the most important for consideration,—namely, attention interrupted by some vivid feeling forcing itself forward and upsetting attention. In this case a great deal depends

on the moral constitution of the person in question. Some have got a very thin moral skin, and every passing influence makes a deep, stirring impression on them. This class of persons are very much at the mercy of the present influence. Although the disturbing cause has no very deep-rooted consequences connected with it, and evidently bears this on its face ; yet, being present, it is of vast importance, and must be attended to. Attention, with this class of persons, is everywhere and nowhere very long. Their moral nature is light and excitable, and, through the whole of life, they flit about from one trifle to another, and never do anything prominent or important. Early training and favourable circumstances might improve this class to a certain extent, but they are generally incapable of very important undertakings. Their moral nature seems deficient in bone and muscle. They can do little things sometimes better than others of an opposite class, their quick movements giving them adaptation for such service. But when set to what requires a long, patient stretch of the mental powers, they fail ; attention loses its command.

One of the most practical points connected with this subject is the consideration that persons of the best natural capacity may lose that capacity by cultivating feelings which are foreign to their happiness and safety. A man may possess every requisite for the successful pursuit of business, and yet fail by his inability to attend to it. His attention is called off to something else. He cannot patiently devote his energies to his business pursuits. He forsakes his business, and his business forsakes him. By indulgence in past time, he cultivated a taste for amusements, until that taste became the ruling passion of his mind. As often as a sense of duty constrained him to go to his desk, that feeling haunted him like a ghost. It came up in the middle of his most important calculations, and blasted the energy with which he should have pursued them. It broke resolutions and disappointed customers. His business should have been the centre of his laborious thinking, but this place was disputed by the cherished attachment to amusements. This feeling got at the bottom of every other and unsettled it. Attention to anything else was so much an uphill work, that it became fidgety and fitful. It is the same in every other department. The following rule may be made out from the preceding considerations :—

First, attention may be disturbed by the senses ;

Secondly, by some feeling or passion which keeps the mind in an unsettled state, and

Thirdly, by lassitude, when the mind requires relaxation.

Then it may be taken as a general law, that attention will not be disturbed unless by a mental force sufficient to produce that change. And the disturbing force is greater when it is able to overcome the zeal which sustains attention.

The practical consideration of this subject is of much importance to most persons. It is especially important for those, the discharge of whose duty demands a persevering attention. When attention is weak or interrupted, the cause should be discovered, and efforts made to remove it. Very frequently attention is weakened or interrupted by the state of one's health. We do not mean by this what may commonly be called bad health, but a state of health which at first sight may not be counted on as an interruption of attention. When strength fails, the spirits droop, the nerves get out of order, and attention suffers in consequence. The party who thus suffers requires to look at his own case as it really is, and apply a remedy if he can in the improvement of his health. Children attending school are frequently subjected to cruel treatment by both parents and teachers, in being urged on to attention by severe measures or cutting remonstrance, when the cause is the disordered state of the health; or, whilst the health may be called good, yet the system, if deficient of nervous strength, produces the same result.

Some are so easily influenced by what is presented to the senses, that the most important pursuit suffers when they are tempted through this channel. This disturbing cause is more potent in childhood and youth than in riper years.

But of all disturbing causes, that of intense feeling is the most important, feeling excited in connexion with some subject which is foreign to that one on which attention is supposed to be fixed.

The man whose mind is under the influence of strong feeling, has his thoughts turned to the circumstances connected with that feeling, notwithstanding his exertions to control them. In the best moments of attention this feeling stands like an importunate beggar soliciting an alms. Nor will it take any denial. But the very efforts to deny it rob attention of its due. It comes again and again, until the mind, bewildered and fatigued with the struggle, seeks repose away

from all contending interests. It withdraws to the flowery fields of imagination, or hides itself in the labyrinthian retreats of reverie. Attention to the subject of pursuit is thus broken and weakened. Nor will the importunate feeling cease to annoy till it is starved out of existence, by withholding from it the food which keeps it alive.

The man who has been once all zeal and energy in his business feels now that he cannot bring his mind to it. He has cultivated a taste for some pleasure or amusement, and that carries away his mind at its bidding. The same may be said of every other department. When attention is interrupted, if health is good, then some counter feeling is at work. If the party thus suffering knows his own moral constitution, his business will be to extinguish the counter feeling. But instead of doing this, the feeling has perhaps got such hold of his mind that he cherishes it, and prefers sacrificing every other consideration.

CHAPTER IV.

REFLECTION AND MEMORY.

SECTION I.

REFLECTION and Memory bear nearly the same resemblance to one another as that which exists between invention and imagination. Both in reflection and memory the mind turns back to review the stores which it has accumulated. But the operation differs, both in the mode of its performance, and the object for which it is performed. In reflection, the understanding reviews the past with the desire of deepening and preserving the record of it on the mind, or else in passing judgment in some way on the character or merits of what is past, or perhaps as a mere exercise of amusement in travelling over ground that was once passed. In memory, the understanding goes back in research of the past, but it is to bring out for present use the stores that have been treasured up in the mind by its power of retention. In memory, the past is brought out in definite, practical order; in reflection, the understanding looks at the past in any order. Memory is exercised for some definite purpose, and, in most cases, in corresponding with some other party. Reflection is always done by one's self, and, for the most part, as an exercise of self-examination.

SECTION II.

Use of Reflection.

In reflection, the understanding not only reviews past acts, but from these it draws conclusions; so that it passes sentence on the whole man. In the absence of reflection, one runs through life in a sort of random path, as a mere mechanical course, marked out by cir-

cumstances. An unreflecting man does not so much question where he is going, or whether he is travelling by the best road; it is enough for him that he is in motion, or perhaps going fast. Without reflection, he is a body in motion, propelled by the mere mechanical force of circumstances. The unreflecting man is unfeeling, rash, and reckless. By reflection one becomes cautious, for he learns his own weakness and failings. He reads in the pages of the past his misguided sayings, his ill-directed doings, and the working of passions and feelings which should have been kept in check. The sting which he receives from such reflections renders him more watchful, because he becomes more sensitive and jealous of his conduct. It is only by viewing the past in the light of rules and principles that one can mark out a path for himself in the future. In general, the unreflecting are unreasonable, rash, and aimless. Reflection does not supply rules and principles, but it is one of the best means for adopting the right and rejecting the bad. On looking over the past, one sees what has worked well, and what has been attended with bad results. And this leads him naturally to the investigation of the principles or rules of conduct which have been at work in producing these results. This exercise, therefore, will tend to confirm what is good, and reject what is bad.

SECTION III.

Varieties of Memory.

A good memory is distinguished by three characteristics; first, a readiness in laying up ideas; second, a lasting retention of them; and third, a quick production of them when required. Some can remember all the circumstances of an incident as fast as it is told to them, and forget it as quickly. Others lay up thought with difficulty, but retain it enduringly. Some retain with ease what they acquire, but cannot bring it forth when it is wanted, they stammer, hesitate, and are slow in reproducing what they have permanently retained.

Some have professed to teach arts of memory, but except for special purposes, and in rare individual cases, they may be considered worse than useless. Memory depends a great deal on the state of the health. This is observable from the sudden loss of memory at

the first approach of ill health. And when health returns, the power of memory is restored. The successful cultivation of memory depends on singleness of attention and earnestness of feeling.

Every one who has attentively observed his own mental operations will perceive that the weakness of his memory consists in two features, first, a confusion of thoughts, and second, a dimness in seeing that which he wants. We cannot go into the mind and give a reason for this peculiarity of memory, that the more it gets in charge, the more retentive and capacious it becomes;—a bad argument this would supply for the materialism of the mind. But keeping to the subject in hand, thought is laid up in the order that it is presented to the mind. If it is all simple and concentrated on one subject, such will be its character in the mind. If it is confused and mixed up of several subjects, such will be its order in the mind. If the mind in both cases is alike earnest,—for memory depends, to a great extent, on earnestness in laying up thoughts,—then, in the first case, memory will recall the subject clear and simple; in the second, if it can be produced, it will be confused. This may be illustrated by a variety of examples. If one listens to the babbling of a crowd, however earnest he may be, as on the occasion of some exciting accident, he can recollect nothing but the confusion, unless he concentrates his attention on some few expressions. The fault does not arise from the exclusion of ideas from his mind, the fault consists in his having too many at the same time, and of all sorts. There is of necessity an absence of order. The memory, in looking back at it, sees it as the eye sees a heap of *débris* strewn down by a flood. The impression is alike in both cases; the memory can recall the sight of the crowd, but it cannot relate the particulars that occurred; it is a mass of confusion, just as the *débris* appears to the eye.

Take a scene that is not so confused, and you recollect in proportion what passes. But bring it down till you have a single subject feelingly impressed on the mind, and then it is remembered with ease. Let it be the case of one in tears, relating the murder of some dear friend or relation, and you recollect every word he says, and even his looks and gestures. But the reason is, there is one simple subject impressed on the mind with earnestness, everything else being excluded. The two essential conditions are singleness of thought with zealous feeling. We have already seen how singleness of thought contributes to the power of memory; it is more difficult to

perceive the nature of the second condition,—namely, that the thoughts must be laid up with earnest feeling. It may be that the feeling is necessary to exclude every other thought completely from the mind at that moment, or its effect may be in some way to prepare the mind for a permanent impression. It is probable that it acts in both these ways. In proportion as the mind is under intense feeling, the understanding is concentrated on the subject connected with the feeling, or rather the subject out of which the feeling grows. With what ease one recollects everything connected with a violent passion, except when that passion is so violent as to distract the understanding, and then it destroys the power of memory. The condition which appears most favourable to the exercise of memory is singleness of thinking, with a feeling so intense as not to become unpleasant. It is certain that what passes through the mind without any special feeling is not long remembered. Repeatedly thinking the same thing over is a sort of substitute for the want of earnest feeling. The ideas thus impressed become permanent for a time, as an ordinary schoolboy commits his lesson to memory.

Then the condition to be aimed at, in order to give memory its full power, is singleness of thought, accompanied with a pleasing degree of zeal. In order to retain the thoughts which are presented to the mind, the mind must entertain them singly, and with an earnest feeling. As has already been stated, both these conditions are essential to a successful exercise of memory. If thoughts are to be retained, they should not be jumbled with others which are only intruders on the occasion. When the mind is agitated with passions and feelings, memory loses its power. What is the reason? The reason is evident; these passions have subjects of earnest thought for their foundation, and they keep constantly intruding them upon the attention. By this means, the subject which forms the supposed exercise of memory is broken, thoughts foreign to it are jumbled and mixed up with it, and the feeling, which should accompany it, is neutralized by the presence of other passions.

SECTION IV.

The Thoughts laid up by Memory always connected.

It may be observed that everything which is laid up in the mind as

a work of memory is related or connected as parts of a whole. When this connexion or relation is effaced the work of memory is lost. When it is partially destroyed, the work of memory suffers in proportion.

Take an example. A man goes on a tour of pleasure and calls at some six or eight places. Memory makes a record of the whole affair. When the record is newly committed to the keeping of memory, the details are minute and accurate in proportion to the interest taken in them by the tourist. For in that proportion other subjects have been excluded from his mind, and the incidents of the tour have been deeply impressed upon it. But then in this record of memory every incident is related, there is a link which precedes each, unless it is the first, and one that follows after it. When this connected relation grows misty in the mind, it soon disappears, and the parts which were the least interesting go first, then others follow in order, and at last only a few leading points, like landmarks, remain behind.

It may thus be seen that the matter of which memory takes charge is related, the one feature to the other, in the order in which it was laid up by the mind. When one of these connecting links is gazed on by the mind, those immediately connecting may be seen or partially seen. In this respect the one may be said to suggest the other; that is, when it is gazed on it brings its neighbour into view. Memory lets go its hold on the less interesting parts first; and then the whole soon disappears and leaves only a few features, or perhaps terms, behind.

It is the repetition of this process from infancy up to manhood, and onward, that leaves such a store of broken, unconnected fragments in the mind, in the shape of terms and items of information without any connecting link. This apparent weakness of the memory in this respect becomes an advantage. Every term, every relation and property with which the mind is conversant has been at some time a link of what the memory held in charge. All our common sense and common knowledge of things has been acquired in this way. The mind of every intelligent adult is thus supplied with what may be called its floating capital, ready to be used up in any way which the mind may adopt. The capacity of the mind increases in exercises of reasoning, imagination, and invention, in proportion as this stock of materials is large and familiarly at hand when required.

CHAPTER V.

THE JUDGMENT.

SECTION I.

THE judgment is one of the most important faculties of the understanding. Whatever one's calling may be, the judgment may be said to be in almost constant operation. The judgment is that faculty of the understanding which passes sentence on a thing in the determination of what it is. This act of judging always supposes two things. First, that the party who thus judges has previously acquired knowledge which enables him to pass sentence on the thing in hand; and second, that he sees the thing in hand in all its parts, if it has parts, so as to apply his knowledge to it correctly. The perfection of judgment depends on the perfection of both these conditions. If either is defective, the judgment is subject to be defective to an equal extent. If both are perfect, the judgment pronounced must be perfect. Take an example. A party walking at night sees an object before him in the dark, which on close inspection he pronounces to be a man. In the first place this argues the conviction on his part that he possesses certain knowledge as to the appearance which he expects a man to present in these circumstances; and second, that he sees the object sufficiently so as to apply that knowledge in the determination of what it is. It will be seen thus that the accuracy of the judgment depends on the accuracy of both these conditions. For suppose the party who determines that the figure in the dark is a man is deficient in his experimental knowledge of what a man's appearance should be in these circumstances, it is evident that his judgment is subject to error in the same proportion. Again, suppose his knowledge is perfect, yet he may be at that time unable to apply it, because he cannot see clearly the outline of the object by reason of the darkness; therefore, in proportion his judgment can only be regarded as a guess.

Again, suppose one pronounces judgment on the character of his neighbour,—namely, that it is immoral. Here the judgment rests on the two rules that have been laid down. First, the party who judges supposes himself to know what immoral character is ; and second, that he has had his neighbour's character sufficiently under his view to enable him to say that it is immoral. If he does not know what immoral character is, he cannot pronounce a truthful judgment on his neighbour's character. And in the second place, if he has not seen the questionable circumstances of his neighbour's character clearly and fully, he is working in the dark, and applying his knowledge partially, or at random ; therefore his judgment must be considered as erroneous, or as mere conjecture.

Take a third case. A man pronounces sentence on a book, and says it is unscriptural. This implies that he knows the teaching of Scripture ; and, secondly, that he has applied that knowledge in the examination of the book, and then pronounces sentence that it is erroneous. But the justness of this sentence rests on the two preceding rules.

The two rules which have been laid down apply to every case in which there is an exercise of judgment. Whether the subject be moral, social, religious, political, or scientific, the two rules specified apply alike to one and all. Is it a party pronouncing on some phenomenon of nature that it is an example of some certain law ? Then the judging party assumes the two conditions laid down for the right exercise of judgment,—namely, that he knows the conditions and phenomena of that law ; and second, that he is in a condition to pronounce on the case in hand that it has fulfilled those conditions.

SECTION II.

Reasoning.

Reasoning, however complicated, is only the exercise of the judgment. It is one act of the judgment built on another, or a second deduced from a first, a third from a second or first, and so on. This is called reasoning, or a process of reasoning, and it is founded on the necessity of fulfilling the conditions of the two laws laid down according only to which judgment can be rightly exercised. By a first act of judgment a certain amount of knowledge is gained ; the decision is counted as reliable matter, and on it a second judgment is founded. The result of the first decision becomes knowledge available

for a second act of the judgment, and the second act becomes available for a third, and so on. It is evident, however, that an error in any act of judgment repeats itself in the acts of judgment which are built upon it, that is, deduced from it.

Take an example of reasoning. A party, on rising in the morning, observes footprints on his garden-beds. On closer inspection he pronounces them to be the footprints of a man. This is an act of the judgment which requires previous knowledge. In the second place he declares them to be made during the night, and this he does by knowledge previously acquired; that is, he is able to determine a footprint newly made from one of longer date. Again: he observes one row of footprints coming from a certain quarter, and then a second row leading back towards the same point. He follows both in the same direction till he traces them to the door of a cottage in the neighbourhood. Here he pronounces a third act of the judgment, but this one is founded on knowledge arising out of the preceding, and gives a genuine example of reasoning; that is, one judgment based on another. His judgment is that the man who was in his garden during the night came out of the cottage, and returned to it again. This judgment is evidently correct. But he examines the footprints more carefully, and finds an odd impression made by large nails driven into the soles. He notes it carefully, has it measured, and the nails counted; and then he goes into the cottage and gets hold of the cottager's shoes, and he finds they answer to the impression exactly. He now declares the cottager to be the party who committed the trespass. And at first sight this judgment might appear correct, but it is not. The cottager has it proved that a neighbour of his, a person of bad character, had been late in his cottage the evening before; and, on examination, this person's boots are found to answer to the character of the impression. He had gone direct from the cottage to the garden, then walked back to the door, but, instead of going in, made his escape by the side of the cottage where his footprints could not be seen. His object was to ruin the character of his neighbour. The example shows how one judgment is deducible from another, and with what care one requires to examine a case where the evidence is circumstantial. Where a judgment is founded on circumstantial evidence, the evidence should be so exhaustive as not to leave the possibility of a mistake.

SECTION III.

Prejudice.

Prejudice is an erroneous exercise of the judgment, arising out of one or other of two mental states, or both combined. These are ignorance and a deranged state of the affections. If a man is ignorant of that about which he would pronounce an opinion, he cannot judge correctly; he is deficient under the first rule on which a right judgment depends, that is, he does not possess sufficient knowledge to enable him to speak of the subject in its fulness and completeness. Then, if he entertains a dislike towards the subject, it is likely to lead him to take only a distorted view of it; or, if he has formed a previous opinion with which he is much in love, this will prevent him from looking at the subject in a fair spirit, so as to judge of it according to the knowledge which he may possess. This latter is the most common form of prejudice. There is in every human breast a natural love for what is its own. A man loves his own home. He thinks of it with kindling feeling when at a distance from it. He sees something in the part of the country where he was bred and born that no stranger can see. The same feeling widens out to his country and people, his government and laws; how much more so to his religion, whether he knows its principles or not. To everything that man calls his own he is bound by natural affection. His joys and sorrows were exercised in connexion with his childish love entwined around a mother's heart. A mother's kindness and a father's care have consecrated all that he calls his own. His affections linger on the grassy spot that wraps their ashes, though that be on a foreign shore. It is this strong affection for all we call our own that constitutes the chief pillar on which prejudice is built. But a man may love his home and love it dearly, and feel his happiness in it all but complete, and yet not work himself up to believe that every other home is a scene of wretchedness and confusion, in which people are addicted to every sort of evil. In the same way, he may prize his own table, and very much relish his own sort of dishes, and yet not work himself up to believe that his neighbours are eating serpents, and must be dead men in a short time. This is natural love distorted and diseased. It is one of the common prejudices of society. It

is that which keeps one nation jealous of another, and ever ready to quarrel without cause.

This is an international vice as little in harmony with enlightened principles and good feeling as religious persecution, which happily is not so fashionable now as it formerly was.

We have said that prejudice is founded on ignorance and a diseased or morbid state of the affections. It would, however, be free from error, did moral evidence admit of being applied in the same measured terms as that of mathematics. The term moral is used in its widest sense. Mathematics borrows its relations from physical objects; and, by the use of fixed and invariable units and symbols of measure, the same definite expression is communicated to all their relations and properties as that which characterizes physical bodies when one is measured by the other. On this mathematical platform men of every age and every tribe and clime meet and agree. This in itself proves that the human mind is the same in every age and circumstance, only different individuals possess different degrees of capacity. But this is apart from the subject.

Although both the moral measure and the moral subject to which it is applied are both indefinite, as compared with the same relations in mathematics, yet the result in the one case is as certain as that in the other. The moral relations do not require the same definite measurement as do those of mathematics or physical objects; but, when moral subjects are truthfully examined, the result is as certain as that which results from mathematical investigation. In moral calculations the result is not so definite as in mathematics; the subject does neither admit nor require that it should be so. Human agency, in its results, is constantly varying. The forces which impel and urge it onward are constantly changing, if not in kind, at least in degree. This arises from man's moral and mental constitution, which cannot be otherwise unless he were himself made a very different agent from what he is. If a moral measure cannot be made of the accurate and determinate character of a mathematical measure, neither is it needed. The moral subject which has got to be measured would not admit of mathematical accuracy. The rule, if it were possible, would do more hurt than good, and would be altogether inapplicable. But the positive or negative relation between the measure and the subject to be measured is as certain and indestructible in morals as that which exists in mathematics.

That a man who discharges the duties of life faithfully is a wise man, is as true and unchangeable as the mathematical proposition that says that all the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles. But wisdom cannot be measured with the accuracy of an angle; and if it could, the moral subject to be measured would still be indefinite. This in itself would render the measure inapplicable to the thing to be measured. The conduct of the wisest and best of men is never stationary; it is sometimes better, sometimes worse. And where can two individuals be found whose conduct could be pronounced in all respects equal? It is, however, the indefinite nature of moral evidence and moral subjects that leaves room for the exercise of prejudice. It is one of the frailties inseparable from our present condition.

SECTION IV.

Judgment dependent on Memory and Imagination.

Judgment is the comparing of two things, so as to determine the relation existing between them, or, in other words, to draw a conclusion from the comparison. That is, as it is expressed in the former part of the chapter, the party judging professes to have knowledge sufficient to affirm or deny something of a subject under consideration. It has been stated that the correctness of the judgment depends on two conditions or laws,—first, that the judging party possess sufficient knowledge to enable him to pronounce a truthful determination; and, second, that the whole of the subject concerning which he judges be presented to his view. If these two conditions are not faithfully fulfilled, justice is not done to the subject. The determination or conclusion may be true, but that can only happen by chance. The comparison is made between the knowledge which the judging party possesses, and the subject to be judged. This comparison is applying the knowledge to the subject, as a rule might be applied to a physical object. The conclusion or inference is the statement expressing how far the one agrees with the other. It is evident that if any portion of knowledge affecting the subject be absent from the view when the comparison is made, the conclusion cannot be a just one, because the rule in that case which is applied to measure the object is deficient. And as to the object to be

measured, it is evident that it cannot be fairly measured unless it is completely presented to view. If any part is absent, then that has not been taken into consideration, or, in other words, it has not been measured. In that case, as in the other, the conclusion or determination must be unjust, unless the subject be of that nature that the measuring or comparing of a part gives the same conclusion the whole would have done.

From this view of judgment it may be seen that it very much depends on memory and imagination. The rule to be applied, or the knowledge possessed which enables the party to judge, can only be applied by the aid of memory; and the more perfectly it is held under the gaze of the mind at one and the same time, the more fairly is the conclusion likely to be deduced. Then, the subject or side to be measured requires to be presented in its fulness and completeness, so that no part be unmeasured. But in every intricate and difficult subject this can only be done by the power of a fruitful imagination. The imagination conceives the subject in its fulness, and presents it to the gaze of the understanding in one comprehensive view, so that the knowledge possessed, or the rule by which it is measured, may be applied to every part of it. And thus a conclusion will be deduced, not from a part of the subject, but from the whole.

Upon the memory depends the supply of the knowledge necessary to judge of the subject; and upon the imagination depends, in most cases, the full conception of the subject. When the judgment is exercised about a person, some one may ask, how can the imagination in that case be exercised in conceiving of the subject—is it possible to judge parts in a case in which the subject is an individual? When an individual is the subject of a judgment, he is judged, or should be judged, in connexion with all his circumstances which may have any bearing on the case. And it is in conceiving of these truthfully and accurately that a right conclusion is come to. The clear, comprehensive exercise of the imagination is of the utmost importance in every case in which the decision rests on conclusive circumstances; for it remains alone with the imagination to supply these. And if they are not supplied, the subject is not presented in its fulness and completeness for the exercise of the judgment. It is not only the person, but all the circumstances of his case which form the subject of the judgment. If any one of these bearing on the case is left out, an equitable opinion cannot be formed of the subject. But it is the

imagination alone which can conceive of these circumstances and present them to the mind in the exercise of judgment. More need not be said on the subject, as every one who uses his own thoughts must perceive that the judgment depends very much on memory and imagination for its proper exercise.

SECTION V.

Judgment very much dependent on Exercise.

But apart from memory and imagination, the judgment of one individual differs very much from that of another, both in its quickness and accuracy. When the subject is presented to the mind in all its fulness, and when every item of knowledge bearing on it is present in the same degree of completeness, still one man will arrive at a decided and clear conclusion in half the time that another will. And in the same circumstances one will arrive at a truthful conclusion, when another will falter, hesitate, and doubt, and perhaps at last give a wrong decision. One excels another to some extent in natural capacity, but a great deal depends on exercise. The operations of the mind are at least as susceptible of improvement by exercise as those of the body. If one will carefully consider what improvement exercise can accomplish in the action of the hand, he may compare it with what can be done in the mind on the same scale, whilst the mind is susceptible of a much higher degree of improvement than that of the body. This improvement by exercise is easily perceived when one comes into contact with those who have spent their time in some special department. How clearly and quickly a farmer can judge of what belongs to his own department of life, compared with one who has had but little exercise in it. How readily a religious man can see a shade of meaning in some religious passage of a book, that another man cannot be brought to understand by all the explanation that can be given him. A lawyer can pick out flaws and defects, when another man of far greater natural capacity can see nothing, even perhaps when it is explained to him. It is the same with the mathematician, and every other department of mental exercise. Each excels, all things else considered, in the special department in which he is exercised. There is no result of exercise more striking than that of the eye in the case of a child learning to

read. At first the eye can only take in a single letter; then, by exercise, it can take in the compound expression of two or three. By-and-by it can take in any ordinary combination, and that with a far greater degree of rapidity than that with which it could previously take hold of single letters, and with far greater accuracy. After the same mode of improvement the mind comes to grasp circumstances and items of evidence, and deduce from them a correct conclusion. This it learns to do by exercise, till it can do it with the rapidity and accuracy of an exercised reader, in expressing sounds from combinations of letters. The effect of exercise in the improvement of the judgment is strikingly exhibited in the case of those who are shut up to some special exercise of the mind. Such persons, however much they may excel in their own department, are found to be slow and lame in the exercise of judgment when called into new fields of thought. This has been observed in the case of mathematicians who have devoted themselves exclusively to mathematics. It is frequently exhibited in the unbusiness-like dealings of men who have devoted their attention exclusively to the sacred office of the ministry, as is well brought out in the "Vicar of Wakefield." Men who are exclusively exercised in the law, have in general little relish for other departments of knowledge. This feature of the result of exercise is universal in life, and proves the point in hand, that the successful exercise of the judgment depends very much on exercise. A striking example of this character is to be seen in the irregular verdicts of juries, simply from the want of exercise in the consideration of intricate questions.

CHAPTER VI.

IMAGINATION AND INVENTION.

HAD imagination been treated of before judgment, its place in the order of the faculties of the understanding would have been more consistent. The more natural order of these faculties would be attention, reflection, memory, imagination, judgment, and invention.

SECTION I.

Imagination.

The imagination is a very important faculty of the understanding. Its work is to form new combinations of the ideas or thoughts which the mind has in store. It makes and destroys creations of its own at will. It draws its materials from that vast store of fragments which memory has laid up in the mind. It cannot create a single element. It depends entirely on the floating capital of the mind for all that it needs. And this capital is quite sufficient. Memory is constantly rearing her mental structures, but time, with its wear and tear, is as constantly reducing them to ruins, leaving at best but a few elementary fragments behind. But these fragments soon accumulate and become one vast heap of miscellaneous elements, constituting what we have already called the floating capital of the mind. Most people use this capital freely, without taking the trouble of inquiring where it came from. And if the query were put, few could return a satisfactory answer. How, or by what means, it came to be what it is, is the only answer that could be returned. It is like the wealth of a great trading merchant; he cannot perhaps go back and tell at whose hands he gained this fragment and that. But there it is; he made it all by industry and care, and it

gradually accumulated, and has become a great capital, and he is prepared to enjoy it, and use it for the best purposes. Imagination draws on its accumulated mass of ideas after the same way. And what a luxury this proves to every one, even the dullest! That apparently stupid and half-lifeless-looking old woman going along the street, of whom one might suppose at first sight that she really had no imagination, has perhaps been doing nothing for hours but amusing herself with it. It is to every living man and woman one of their most frequent mental exercises, and generally one of the most agreeable. But it happens, unfortunately, from man's dark nature, that many people prefer building a very ragged and ugly structure, when they could have reared a beautiful one, with less sacrifice of time and means. It is so, too, in the architectural labour of the imagination. Many who could rear noble structures, with snug, capacious apartments, spend more time and expense in building dark, gloomy apartments, underground, away from heaven's light, or suffocating garrets, where life is strangled. But whatever the character of the building may be, the imagination of most persons is not long idle.

SECTION II.

Use of Imagination.

The very least reflection will convince every one that the operations of imagination constitute a very large proportion of mental action. It has already been stated, and we think proved, that the judgment depends on it at least as much as it does on memory. It was then observed that the subject could not be seen by the mind in its fullness and completeness unless displayed by the aid of the imagination. If this be considered as exhibited in the business of every-day life, the subject will appear in its proper proportions. Let some enterprise be about to be undertaken, who is it that does not ask, How is it likely to do? And as this question, or a similar one is put, does he not, at the same time, draw a picture to his mind of the whole affair? But this is the work of imagination. Imagination runs out before, and supplies every incident and member of the whole proceeding. It looks at the enterprise set on foot, sees the means applied, considers their sufficiency and their probable result. In such an exercise the judg-

ment is at work. But it is the imagination which clothes the undertaking with a body, supplies it with members, breathes life into it, and sets it a-going. Then the imagination follows it, protects it, rejoices at its success and is pained at its failure. It considers the obstacles to be surmounted, and the steps by which they can be climbed. It goes into all the joys of success, and is pained amid the ruins of disaster. But it must be remembered that, in all such deliberations, imagination and judgment go side by side like twin sisters. Imagination presents the picture, and judgment passes sentence on the performance. Imagination places the subject for dissection on the table, and judgment uses the knife and the microscope. The speculating merchant follows his enterprise into the future, views it in all its telling points, and reconstructs or adopts it, as his judgment condemns or approves the skeleton marked out by imagination. The general sees his forces engaged, before they have seen the enemy; he sees his opponent's efforts to take advantage, like one playing at a game, and his own movements to keep clear of blunders and lead his troops to victory. Imagination conjures the scene into life's proportions, and clothes it with all its interests; but it is the work of judgment to improve, correct, or transform it.

There is no department of life, public or private, in which imagination does not play an important part. The poor labourer who drags slowly to his daily toil, pictures, perhaps, before he got out of bed, what his day's toil was likely to prove. But in his case it is rather as an amusement than a duty that he engages in it. But, even in his measured toil, there are circumstances which require him to consider how he should act so as best to discharge his duty.

In the great struggles of moral and religious life, imagination takes an important part, either for good or bad. In these struggles, it may be said of it that its services, like other powers of the mind, are frequently on the wrong side. But the Christian draws comfort from the exercise of a sanctified imagination, when it is borne aloft on the wings of hope, and takes a sunny view of the land that is far off. And in those moral and religious struggles in which men engage, as in martial combat, imagination plays an important part in sketching out the field of contest, with all the traps and snares of the enemy.

The use of imagination as an amusing relaxation of the mind, is not the least important. If any one will reflect on the course of his

own musings, he will convince himself that they very largely consist in exercises of the imagination. There is no position in which the mind more naturally relaxes its toils than when it amuses itself with scenes of its own creation. How pleasant to glide off with more than the speed of lightning, and see and talk with friends hundreds of miles away, and all without toil, trouble, or expense! Again to wander by the side of rivers and streams, pluck sunny flowers in woods and glens, and climb the mountain-sides, the scenes of boyhood's wanderings, is pleasant beyond expression. The imaginary tourist can do this in a prison, or lounging on a sofa, or sitting by his fire, or walking in the field. To engage in stirring scenes of patriotism, to encounter robbers and make them prisoners, to defend the helpless, to relieve the destitute and deliver the oppressed, and all without rising off one's chair, is both cheap and agreeable. But such are the feats of imagination. It revels in the endless round of amusing life. It supplies hope with its brightest pictures, and loads fear with frightful scenes. It offers its services to suspicion, and supplies all sorts of tricks, traps, nets, snares, and devices, and all sorts of enemies only for the asking. It creates and destroys at command. It is the readiest servant in the universe, and the most efficient mechanic. But for it, what a dreary and prosaic affair human life would be!

It is hardly needful to remark, that imagination is as ready a servant in a bad exercise as it is in a good or harmless one. What scenes of pollution defile that breast where the passions are strong, the heart unclean, and the imagination productive! In such a case the imagination supplies fuel to the devouring passion. It places its victim face to face with the scenes of his uncleanness and debauchery. Every additional transgression supplies it with new elements, only to be served up in future in rendering his reformation more hopeless. This process repeated, at last ushers in that terrible state described by the prophet, "Can the Ethiopian change his skin, or the leopard his spots? then may ye also do good that are accustomed to do evil."

SECTION III.

Fancy.

Imagination includes all that is usually ascribed to fancy. Fancy is the poetry of imagination. When imagination works in the field

of flowers and gay thought, it is distinguished by the term fancy. All that is sprightly in poetry, so far as it is the work of imagination, is ascribed to fancy. Fancy is the play of the imagination, whether that play be written, spoken, or confined to thinking. Its work is to beautify the poetry of thought with blooming flowers.

SECTION IV.

Invention compared with Imagination.

Invention resembles imagination; in both, the understanding is engaged in the construction of a building. Invention rears a building to answer certain given conditions; it is thus called invention, because it finds out the relations that will satisfy the given conditions. In imagination the understanding rears a structure which at best is only expected to be a probable picture of the real, which is then absent. In imagination the mind has a voluntary scope for exercise, but in invention it is stringently bound down to the conditions of the problem. Hence it is that imagination is a sort of intelligent play, but invention is an unyielding drudgery.

But it is known that those who excel in imagination excel in invention. The reason is, that that which constitutes the foundation of both is the same. In each there is the imaginative power of forming mental imagery out of the materials which the mind has at its disposal. This imaginative power not only forms the image, but it can hold it firm under the gaze of the mind as if it stood out in living features. In each there must be the exercise of a good judgment. If this is wanting in imagination, the picture must come short in its object; it will not be the picture which it is intended to be. And, in the exercise of invention, the judgment is indispensable, else every attempt will prove a failure. The imaginative power forms the picture, but it is the judgment that passes sentence on its fitness to serve the end in view. And, although imagination and invention are thus closely connected, so that they who excel in one cannot be deficient in the other, yet they are, as mental exercises, very different in their character. Invention is a prosaic, laborious work; imagination is more of a poetic character. Imagination is not stinted nor tied, even when faithful in its representations; but invention is stiff and unbending. Imagination permits of painting and garnishing; but

invention is naked and colourless. No mental exercise requires so much patience as invention, and none requires less than imagination. For this reason invention and imagination address themselves to persons of very different mental habits.

These remarks, however, apply only to prominent cases of these departments of mental labour. In a more ordinary way, imagination and invention fall to the lot of every rational person; but they bear the same characteristics as modes of the understanding.

SECTION V.

Nature of Invention.

Invention can build, but it must be supplied with all the materials of which the building is composed. In the common sense of the word, it makes creations of its own, but every element of them had a previous existence. Invention proceeds from the known to the unknown, as an engineer pushes his embankment into the sea, keeping up his connexion with the land. It takes hold of original elements, and with them it erects a building. This building it uses as the groundwork or part of a second building. When that is erected, it uses it as the groundwork or part of a third building; and so on, to any extent.

Invention makes its work sure as it proceeds, and by this means it is able to use its own productions as if they were new elements prepared for the re-erection of still loftier and grander fabrics. This is the secret of its strength and greatness. Its work resembles the power of nature in the development of the giant oak from the little acorn.

The inventor sets out with a definite notion of something which is wanted. That something is hardly ever a single element, for, if it were, its supply could not perhaps be regarded as an invention. The something which is wanted is a combination of elements. The inventor, by the power of imagination, makes compound after compound, if so required, till he falls on that one which satisfies the conditions with which he set out. Invention depends for its success on the facility of the mind for forming mental imagery, and of being able clearly to look at its bearing comprehensively and in all its parts. When the mind can do this, it is prepared for invention in the prac-

tical sense of the word. When the mind can do this in a quiet, clear style, it succeeds with intricate and compounded structures which it could not manage so well if aided by the senses, with the aid of bodies or lines. The mind can conceive itself in a position for viewing the work which it could not enjoy if the work had a material existence.

There are three conditions essential to the exercise of invention,—First, the mind must be supplied with the material elements; second, it must have a distinct notion of what is wanted; and, third, it must be capable of looking at its own creations in a clear, comprehensive way.

As to the first, it obtains materials by that process which goes on in every mind from its earliest existence; that is, the storing up of fragmentary knowledge by means of the memory. We have spoken of this under imagination. The mind, by the exercise of memory, gets hold of incidents and scenes. These in turn become broken up from the weakness of memory; but fragments are left behind. The mind, for years being in constant exercise, acquires an immense mixed store of knowledge, but it does not consider how or when it was obtained. This store is made up of the knowledge of all the material and moral relations with which we are brought in contact. With many of these relations the mind becomes so familiar, that when one member of the relation is present the other seems as if it had come to view. This is frequently called suggestion. For example,—One has the thought of an assembly of young people met on holiday occasion, and there comes naturally up with it the thought of jokes and amusement. One speaks of the winter, and there comes up with it naturally the thought of cold, high winds and storms. One speaks of death, and it suggests the grave, or any of the other thoughts closely allied to it. One speaks of a hill, and he may have the thought of its sloping sides or its precipitous rocks. But this fragmentary store, with its pairs of thought, is accumulated by the process of memory already referred to. The qualities of bodies, their figure, mechanical relations, &c., are all acquired after the same mode. The mind of any intelligent adult by this means becomes supplied with what we have already called fragmentary knowledge, which serves as elements for an unlimited amount of reconstruction. They may be compared to a printer's type-letters, which he can put together for any purpose.

The second requisite of invention is a clear conception of what is wanted. One cannot build a house without a plan of some sort. A road cannot be constructed till the points through which it is to pass are first marked out. Without keeping clearly before the mind what is wanted, one can make no intelligent attempt at invention. A convict cannot invent a means of escape until he has first ascertained the character of the barriers that shut him out from liberty.

The third requisite of invention is the most important and is the one which determines the character of the inventor. This is the ability to raise mental structures, view them in all their parts, and determine their bearing on the end in view. It is only the inventor that can do this well. Every rational man is in possession of the first two qualifications, namely, the accumulated elements by means of memory, and a notion of what is wanted, or may have a notion of what is wanted in problems of invention. The elements of knowledge are the building materials, the notion of what is wanted is the plan, but the building can be raised only by the inventor. In this department mind wins its greatest victories over matter in its absence. It is true that the inventor makes frequent experiments with objects in attempting to solve a problem, but the mind makes its greatest achievements when all objects are absent. The mind by its power of imagination places itself in points of view which under any other circumstances would be impossible. It sees what it could not see if the elements of the invention were really constructed. By its power of imagination it dispenses with the usual laws of vision, and views its work rather as a disembodied spirit. In these imaginary excursions the mind goes into corners and crevices where the eye could never penetrate aided by the means which inventions and discoveries have placed at its disposal. It reduces solids to the convenience of lines, and can view them as diagrams could never exhibit. In these imaginary views it annihilates objects, and yet conceives them present in all their relations. In every physical invention this is the secret of power.

SECTION VI.

Invention is of two kinds, Physical and Moral.

There are two kinds of invention, moral and physical. Although

the mental process in both is the same, yet in the one it is much easier than in the other. Moral invention does not admit of being measured to a point as physical invention does and must be. In moral invention there is greater play of the imagination than in the physical, its conditions are not so stringent, for the reason which has just been assigned. Moral relations cannot be measured, nor be made the measures to a point, as physical relations are and must be. In moral invention there are degrees of fitness, each one satisfying the required conditions, but in higher and lower degrees. In physical invention there are no degrees. It is true that two or more inventions may be made to answer the same end, and one of these may be more to purpose than the rest, still this does not affect the stringency of the conditions in each. A mathematical truth may be established by two or more demonstrations which have been invented for this purpose, and one of these may be more simple than the other. But if the theorem is established by each of these demonstrations, then in each of these invented demonstrations certain conditions have been rigidly complied with, that is, measured to a point. But in moral relations neither the measure nor the thing to be measured admits of such measurement; so far as invention is concerned moral fitness is not absolute but only in degree, and this renders moral invention a less stringent exercise than physical invention. But the fitness of the conditions in a moral invention requires truth for their basis as much as in the conditions of the physical invention. Bunyan in his moral invention, "The Pilgrim's Progress," measured himself by truth in the execution of his great work, as much as Euclid did in his mathematical, "The Elements of Geometry." We have here used the term physical in preference to mathematical, as contrasting with moral. The term moral we have of course used in its widest sense. But, returning to the subject, Bunyan might have added to the numbers of his great structure or deducted from them without in the least affecting the truth. But Euclid could not have done so. The truths advanced in Euclid are not inventions, it is only the demonstrations of them that can be considered as such. After the same way we may observe that Bunyan does not invent any truth, he only invented an illustration of the truth. Nothing can be called a moral invention except what is original and intended to illustrate some moral relation or convey some moral truth. Milton's "Paradise Lost," is a moral invention in which the conditions are still less

stringent than those produced in Bunyan's work. If parable and fable are well executed the conditions are as unyielding, perhaps more so, than the conditions of any other sort of moral invention. Such inventions as those of the spinning-frame and the steam-engine tax mental capacity more than any other. The void to be filled up by the mental creation is a greater blank ; it makes perhaps a greater demand on that process of creation resting on creation with the final one producing exactly the result intended. Each of the preceding fills its own place, conducing to the final result, as a brick in the middle of a wall sustains the one above it. In these complicated inventions there is great range of the imagination, with clear, penetrating judgment and patience, and perseverance inexhaustible.

CHAPTER VII.

OF THE FEELINGS IN GENERAL.

SECTION I.

Introductory Remarks.

If there should be repetitions of some statements made in the first part, the writer has only to say that such will not be made through neglect. The work has been got up in not very favourable circumstances, and it would be almost a wonder if there were no repetitions in it.

We have briefly treated of the understanding as coming first in the order of mental action. For it is by the action of thought that feeling is awakened. It has already been laid down that feeling and thinking are essentially different. Feeling has a beginning, an increase or decrease, and an end. Feeling in its action is not momentary, it lasts as if it were a mental state. Thinking is momentary. A thought occupies the least possible division of time which we can conceive. Feeling, as to its time of duration, might be compared to a pressure; thinking to an impulse.

The office of thinking is to select, pick, choose, guide; but in doing this, as well as in other exercises of thinking, it awakens feeling. The office or work of awakened feeling is to impel to action. This is directly or indirectly the object of all feeling. But for feeling, man would be a mere vacant, inactive, contemplative being. Without the impulse of feeling he would attempt nothing. If left to the impulse of feeling, without the guidance of a reasoning under-

standing, his conduct would be most irregular and destructive to himself and others.

It has been observed, in the first part of the work, that passion is but a higher degree of feeling. Emotion, as it is used generally, expresses a passion. It is commonly employed to express a moderate passion of an agreeable character. Therefore, in speaking of feeling, we shall be understood as comprehending passion, passion being but a higher or stronger development of feeling. And if speaking of passion, we shall be understood as comprehending feeling, which is the basis of passion, unless speaking of something specified as belonging to passion as such.

Before attempting to classify the feelings, it is requisite to speak, first, of the elements of which each feeling is composed.

SECTION II.

The Component Elements of Feeling.

It has been usual to speak of feelings and passions as each being composed of one simple element, distinguished by the name given to the passion or feeling. But in reality each is made up of four essential elements, and in strong passions there is a fifth, which is seldom found in feeling.

The first is the disturbing element, the second is desire, the third is joy, the fourth sorrow, and the fifth, in strong passions, satiety ending in repulsion.

The third and fourth were intended, on first thoughts, to be considered as one, as they both occupy one place, namely, third in the order of the passion; only the one being the opposite of the other, they being in their nature contrary, when joy is present, sorrow cannot make its influence to be felt, if it can joy escapes. But whether they be counted third and fourth elements, or simply a third element, with two characters, a positive and a negative, the sense remains the same. One of the two is present in every prominent passion and feeling, I should say when the feeling or passion runs its course.

Every part of creation bears marks of a great omnipotent Wisdom designing and planning the whole; but no part bears marks so wonderful and interesting as the human mind. The elements of feeling

and passion will be found to exhibit such marks in a striking degree.

In relation to the first element, some difficulty has been experienced in giving it a suitable name. Had it been called irritation, the name would suitably express the first element in some passions, whilst it would fail in others. On second thoughts, the writer has determined to call the first element emotion, which is using an old word, rather than coining a new one. The word sounds well, and in its general meaning serves better than any other; and, as far as this treatise is concerned, the word is not employed to discharge any other function.

Then the order will stand thus: First, emotion; second, desire; third, joy and sorrow; fourth, satiety. Joy and sorrow are two elements, and occupy but one place. Emotion is awakened by the action of the understanding deliberating on the circumstances calculated to produce that effect. In speaking thus, we use emotion as the first element of the feeling or passion.

The understanding awakens emotion under any of its modes of thinking. When it receives communications from without in the exercise of attention, feelings are awakened. When it turns on the past in the exercise of reflection, it is constantly touching topics which more or less kindle feelings and passions, according to their nature and connexion. When the understanding, in the person of memory, opens its stores of accumulated thought, feelings kindle as vividly as they did when these thoughts were first laid up,—in some cases more vividly, in others less. But in no case are feelings and passions so permanently awakened, as when the understanding sits as judge. Then it is that the importance of circumstances and relations are weighed and determined, and feelings are nursed into life, which become habitual, and are never extinguished, such as those connected with a sense of duty. Nor does the understanding, in the exercise of any of its modes, stir the feelings more actively than it does by its exercise of imagination. Here it builds castles and paints pictures without restraint, and laughs and weeps over them alternately. Nor in the dry and stiff exercise of invention, does the understanding altogether fail to influence the feelings. The understanding awakens feeling under each of its modes, according to the circumstances. And emotion is the part of the feeling or passion first awakened.

The object of the feeling or passion being to incite to action, the emotional part gives birth to the second element in it, namely, desire. Desire is the active part of the passion or feeling ; but for it passion would burn to no purpose. Desire is the element of action, either in the attractive or repulsive passions and feelings. In love, its aim is a closer union with the object beloved. In hatred, its efforts are to get away from the object hated. The emotional element of feeling gets lost in desire, as the latter becomes fully developed. Desire is the motive element. And it is so ordered by the wise Author of our nature that desire, as soon as it has attained its object, gets lost in the third element, joy. This may be called the element of reward or happiness. But if anything occurs which snatches from joy its possession, sorrow or grief is the element whose influence is then felt ; or if desire fails to obtain the object of its pursuit, then grief, as the third element, asserts its place. This seems to be an element of retaliation, to give edge and earnestness to the passion. It is the element of unhappiness and misery. Desire, for the most part, becomes extinguished in it, when the understanding passes sentence that further pursuit would be fruitless, or when the circumstance is such that it needs not a moment's deliberation. Although we have considered the element of grief as a sort of retaliation to impart earnestness and edge to the feeling or passion, yet, in other respects, it must be viewed as an element of safety to the mind. The fierce and exhausting element of desire gets quenched in grief, and the mind returns to a quiet, healthy state.

It will be seen that joy and grief occupy the same place in the order of the elements ; that is, both come after desire. If desire is successful, it is lost in joy ; if unsuccessful, it is quenched in grief. Satiety, as the fourth element, ending in a sort of reaction, succeeds both joy and grief alike. In the case of joy, it becomes lost in satiety. Grief has exactly the same ending. Here there is a striking distinction between the feelings and the passions. There is no fourth element in those feelings which are intended to exercise an habitual influence. It is in strong passions that the fourth element plays an important part. Here the wisdom of the Creator is again strikingly displayed. For the fourth element, satiety, brings the strong passion to a close, the mind being incapable of bearing it for any lengthened period. Its exercise is only needed for special occasions, and therefore provision is made for allowing it to die a natural death. This

strong passions do by means of this fourth element. In some cases, when the passion has been long indulged and has been violent, this element ends in a certain measure of reaction.

But in quiet feelings, which require to be kept alive and nurtured, there is no fourth element; for, if there were, it would render the feeling fruitless. In such cases the three preceding elements are weak in proportion. Emotion is gentle, desire mild, and joy and grief temperate. This renders the quieter feelings healthy, and capable of constant exercise.

SECTION III.

The Elements of one Passion are as distinct and different from those of another as the Passions themselves are.

All will agree that the first element, emotion, differs in one passion or feeling from what it is in another passion, just as the former passion or feeling differs from the latter. That is, the emotion of anger is a very different thing from the emotion of love, in the same proportion as anger differs from love. This we think will be generally admitted.

But this difference between the second element in each passion and feeling will not, we think, be so readily agreed to; namely, that desire in one feeling or passion is as different in its nature from desire in another passion or feeling, as passion or feeling in the first case differs from passion or feeling in the second.

Yet, if any one will carefully reflect on the nature of desire in one feeling, he will be able to perceive that it differs from desire in another feeling, just as the first feeling differs from the second. For example,—the desire of revenge is as different from the desire of friendly feeling, as revenge itself is different from friendly feeling; and anger does not differ more from love than the desire of anger differs from the desire of love. The desire of each passion and feeling has in it the character of its own respective passion or feeling. Desire as an element, has the same end in each feeling, namely, it is the moving principle; it is the principle of moral attraction and repulsion. This is all that the desire of one feeling has in common with the desire of any other. The desire of hatred is to get away from the hated object; the desire of love is to get into closer union with

the object beloved. In the one case desire is the element of repulsion; in the other it is the element of attraction. In both it is the element of action; but in the one it is action in one direction, in the other it is action in the opposite. When we say action, we mean in this case tending to action; for feeling does not in reality always lead to action. The strongest passions are sometimes suppressed in obscurity; but the moving power is there, and the moving element in each feeling and passion is desire. But we have seen that, whilst desire, as the second element of every feeling, plays in each the same part, yet in its nature it shares the character of the feeling of which it is an element.

The third element is joy when the feeling has attained its object, or sorrow when it has proved unsuccessful. We have the same remarks to offer in connexion with this element as were made in connexion with the second; namely, that joy in one feeling is not the same as joy in another feeling; that the one differs from the other, as the feelings to which they belong differ. It needs no lengthened reasoning to prove, that the joy which is felt when anger attains its object, is very different from the joy of love; and the sorrow of the one is quite different from the sorrow of the other.

The love of gain is a strong feeling; so is filial affection. But the joy of the one is as different from the joy of the other, as the love of gain is different from the love of parents. Love of gain urges on the man who is in quest of riches, and when he acquires the object of his pursuit he rejoices. Love of parents will urge an affectionate child to undertake great labour and encounter dangers to reach a loving father or an affectionate mother, and when the feeling has attained its object, the child is full of the most animated joy; but how different his joy from the joy of the man in pursuit of wealth!

Or, if we contrast the patriot, moved on by the love of country to risk his life and encounter dangers; when he has rendered some prominent service to his country he rejoices, but his joy is a very different passion to the joy of the money-seeker when he has gained the end of his desire for gold. And the sorrow of the one differs alike from the sorrow of the other, when the feeling in each case fails to attain its object. In the same way any other two feelings might be contrasted; and the joy or sorrow of the one would be found to be as different from the joy or sorrow of the other, as the one feeling, considered as a whole, differs from the other, con-

sidered as a whole. The term grief might be used in contrast with joy, with as much propriety as the term sorrow.

Of course it will be perceived that the object of this reasoning is to prove that joy is a distinct element in every feeling, and that grief, occupying the same relation in every feeling as that of joy, is proved after the same way to be in each feeling a distinct element.

SECTION IV.

Objections answered.

Some one may object to joy being merely an element of every feeling and passion, and not rather a passion in itself. And in proof he may say, is not joy a passion by itself, when all of a sudden it bursts out on the occasion of some happy incident turning up? This objection, at first sight, might appear plausible to those who had not carefully studied the subject. Joy being the reward of every feeling and passion, it frequently makes its appearance apart from the two preceding elements of the feeling. This occurs when the object of the feeling is attained at a time when the feeling itself was not in operation. Take an example. An affectionate child is habitually under the influence of tender love to its parents. The feeling is actively awakened as incidents call it into exercise. Suppose the parents of this affectionate child are absent from it; it is spoken to of its father and mother, and their kind inquiries about it. Its feeling heart heaves with emotion, and it sighs under the pressure of a longing desire to see the objects of its affection. Here the first two elements of the passion are in powerful exercise, but they do not attain their object. The child cannot go to its fond parents, and the parents do not come to it. But, when it has almost forgotten them, and is not under the least influence of affectionate remembrance, suddenly the parents make their appearance, and the child is overcome with joy. But had there been no emotion of fondness previously, and no desire to see the parents, there certainly would have been no outburst of joy at their appearance. The joy in this case is as much the third element of the affection as if the other two had immediately preceded it. If any other case be carefully considered, the same connexion of the elements of feeling will be established. No one can be the subject of joy

in any case except there has been the exercise of corresponding feeling in connexion with it. This statement will be found to have no exception. Whatever new relationship one may be placed in, he can have no feeling of joy from it, unless he perceives that it is the realization of some object about which he has at some time been exercised with feeling. This will at once be seen in connexion with every acquisition of sudden or unexpected gain. There is joy felt on the discovery; but there would not be a trace of it had there been no feeling before urging on to the general acquisition of gain. One may long be the subject of a feeling of hope, and it may, to all appearance, have died out, when, suddenly, the object of it is brought into possession; then there is joy, but it is only the joy of the previous hope when that hope or feeling has attained its object. The same reasoning applies in every case to sorrow or grief. There cannot be any experience of sudden grief, except upon the discovery of something being lost in connexion with which some feeling was exercised. The discovery is only a source of grief in proportion as it reveals the disappointment of feeling previously exercised. It may be the loss of a friend, but there would be no grief had there been no friendly feeling in previous times. It may be the loss of reputation, but there would be no grief if there were no feeling of self-respect. The case does not require examples to be multiplied. The mind only requires to be put on the proper drift of reasoning, and the case will appear clear as anything can be. Joy and grief everywhere are third elements of some feeling or passion; the one may be considered as a reward, the other as a punishment. Both are stimulants to perseverance; but the one exerts its influence in one direction, the other in an opposite; the one is the gush of happiness which vents itself over success, the other is the chill of misfortune and disappointment.

SECTION V.

Of the Fourth Element, Satiety.

It has already been stated that satiety, as the fourth element of passion, is peculiar to passion, and has no place in connexion with feelings which were intended to be habitual, and pervading in their influence the general business and relations of life. This must be

limited, however, to those feelings which constantly attend a sense of duty. These feelings frequently relax their influence, according to circumstances, but cannot be said to be suspended, as passions generally are, by satiety. But some remarks have been made on this subject in a preceding section, and need not be repeated here. That which should be discussed here is, that satiety in one passion is different from satiety in another, as the one passion differs from the other. If any one will consult his own experience, he cannot doubt the truth of this. It may be remarked here, that satiety, as the fourth element of passion, follows grief as readily as it does joy. Its design is evidently to bring the exercise of the passion to a close; so that, whether the passion is successful or not, the result is the same. If it is successful, there is the flush of joy; but satiety at length intrudes itself, and there is an end of it. If the passion is unsuccessful, there is the chilling pressure of grief, but neither is this allowed to last, for yawning satiety comes in without invitation, and quietly puts an end to the whole affair. Its timely presence is the best sign of a healthy mind.

SECTION VI.

Classification of the Feelings.

The object of thought is to guide, that of feeling to impel to action. This object kept in view is the best rule for the classification of feeling. The modes of the understanding are adapted to man's circumstances; so is the variety of feeling. Man is endued with susceptibility of feeling suited to the discharge of the duties incumbent upon him. From the depravity of man's nature, his feelings have got a right and a wrong side. His worst feelings are but the aberrations of right ones originally implanted. He has got no feeling which is in itself absolutely and independently bad. His bad feelings are good ones abused or subverted. His moral nature proves itself to have been originally good. His depraved nature is the superadded. His moral nature is a building deformed and shattered, but there is enough in it to prove that the foundation was once good, and the building perfect.

Man's active conduct is of a fourfold character, namely, the animal, the moral, the intellectual, and the religious. His mind has been

endowed by the Creator with feelings suited to each of these characters. He has animal propensities in common with other animals. He has moral feelings suited to the discharge and enjoyment of moral life. He is an intellectual being, and is surrounded with objects intended by his Creator for the exercise of his reasoning powers. As such he is supplied with feelings which stimulate him in the exercise of intelligence. For the enjoyment and exercise of his religious nature he was equally supplied with suitable feelings. These four classes of feelings are all more or less depraved; not one is what it originally was. Its exercise is either defective, or in excess, or subverted. Men may speak and write otherwise of it if they please; but the universal experience of our race confirms what may be seen in every-day life, namely, that man's moral nature is depraved. But in the Gospel there is provision for its recovery.

We could not contribute to an enlightened view of the doctrines of the mind, by reciting, as far as that could be done, the names of the several passions and feelings as used in our language. The same feeling is called by different names, as the passion of the sexes is called love, affection, attachment, &c. Again, the same word is made to express feelings which have nothing in common except that they are feelings; as love is used to express the passion of the sexes, a mother's attachment to her child, and the habitual feeling which the drunkard has acquired for strong drink; although in all these there is no element common, except that all of them, and many more expressed by the same convenient word, are agreeable feelings of an attractive character. To classify feelings according to the names by which they are expressed in our language, would be a hopeless as well as a useless task. The best that can be done is to ascertain the leading relationships of human agency which give expression to the various forms of feeling and passion. If these are understood, the terms which express them signify but little. In time language conforms to the views of the mind.

SECTION VII.

Rule for Classification of the Feelings.

We take it for granted that the reader yields his assent to the doctrine, that everything which a man does, to that he is impelled by feeling.

The best rule, then, for the classification of feeling is, to consider the leading functions which it was intended man should fulfil in the several relations of life. The more clearly this is kept in view, the more simple and easy becomes the classification of the feelings. The character of an all-wise and benign Wisdom is strikingly exhibited in the variety and character of those feelings with which the human mind is endued. Where strength of feeling was seen to be necessary, there strong passion is at hand to vindicate its power. Weak, delicate feeling is supplied where that is best suited to the end in view. Again, feeling is only developed when the circumstances suitable for its exercise are present ; and if these are not supplied the feeling remains out of sight. This view of the subject is, however, apart from the abuse of the feeling. But, as a general rule, the kind of feeling and the strength of feeling have been prepared for the occasion. But it is the exercise of thought which gives it expression and direction. This is the case in the merest animal feelings ; apart from the exercise of thought their demands could not be answered, unless guided by another, as the infant is by the mother. Thought, in every case, must give expression and direction to feeling. In the case of mere animal feelings, whose object is the preservation of the body, feeling depends less on the exercise of thought than in any other case. But this is not the subject of discussion : our subject is the classification of feeling.

The laws which regulate the moral world bear a marked resemblance to those which govern the physical. This is strikingly the case with regard to the two principles, attraction and repulsion. The feelings of the human mind may be divided into two classes, corresponding with these two principles in the physical universe—attraction and repulsion. One class of feelings are attractive in their nature, and tend to unite and draw persons closer in relationship ; another class of feelings tend to separate parties, and keep them

at a distance. The various modifications of these two principles are at the bottom of all the social and moral phenomena exhibited by our race.

SECTION VIII.

Centres of Feeling.

Many eminent writers have held that the feelings have but one centre,—viz., that of selfishness, or, as it is commonly called, self-love. This is contradicted by every one's experience. The feelings have all a definite object, and were intended by the Creator to serve a certain end. That end was, that man might sustain all his relations, so as to be happy himself and render others happy as far as his means extended. To sustain his relations aright selfishness could not be the centre of all his conduct; but it was necessary that it should be the centre of certain feelings designed for man's own preservation and happiness. For if one will not attend to his own safety who will do it? To this extent, and this only, selfishness, in a qualified sense, may be considered as a centre of feeling. Man is compelled to struggle for his own support, to procure for himself the comforts and conveniences of life. For this purpose he is endowed with feelings prompting him forward in the pursuit of means. In procuring these he must encounter difficulties, and expose himself sometimes to danger: and for this purpose he is armed with suitable feelings, as hope, courage, anger, &c. But an individual man does not exist by himself: he is dependent, to a certain extent, on the assistance and co-operation of others; and others, to a certain extent, depend on him. Each of these becomes the centre of a class of feelings; then the second centre of feeling is our dependence on others. In proportion to the extent of this dependence feeling is strong and influential. There is affectionate attachment, as in the case of children towards their parents. Other feelings spring out of this attachment as in the case of self-love. It is by the exercise of these feelings that the dependent party is put in agreeable relationship to the party on whom he depends: and this is the object of the imparted feelings: it is that a certain end may be accomplished, and that happiness may be mutually enjoyed whilst an indispensable work is performed. The feelings in exercise are of the attractive class, and hold the parties in

union till the end is attained. Feelings are developed as their influence is needed. The infant feels attachment to its parents, first to its mother, then to its father; but the mind requires to be developed before it feels any strong attachment to its brothers and sisters, except as playmates or as nurses; and it only becomes decided and fixed when the mind is capable of reasoning; as when the party can say that that is my sister, or that is my brother, therefore I must do so and so. Here design is strikingly displayed. It is only as persons begin to grow up in life that brotherly and sisterly duties, in the full sense of the word, come into exercise; and it is later still that the party feels his relationship of cousin, &c. And here, from man's depravity, too many stop short, and cannot go on to realize a practical connexion with all mankind. And, but for that depravity, mankind would universally feel their relationship to God in depending on Him, and the corresponding feeling of loving attachment. But here are the marks of human wreck more than in any other relationship.

Then there is the third centre of feeling, namely, the dependence of others upon us. This is glaringly opposed to the absurd system of universal selfishness. A mother feels fondly attached to her child, and cannot help it; and, if she searches for a reason, the only one she can find is that it is helpless and depends on her exclusively, and that it drew its first life from her. But if anything stirs her ever-bubbling affection, it is the idea of its helpless dependence that touches her. There is not a trace of selfishness in the feeling; she cannot help it. When selfishness comes in, it destroys the mother's feelings; as in the case of too many mothers following their own indulgence at the expense of their suffering offspring. This feeling of attachment, in a certain scale, is felt towards all objects depending on us. There is a feeling of sympathy for a dumb animal, although perhaps entirely useless, simply because we know it depends on us alone for protection. The feeling of attachment to one's country arises chiefly from this consideration. Your country depends on you with all its dearness of associations.

SECTION IX.

Classification of Feelings—continued.

Some of the most important feelings cannot be arranged under any general class. This might appear evident at first sight. The end of feeling being to impel to action, it is evident they were not bestowed on man in classes, but to answer the end of his varied circumstances ; and it is only as his conduct can be classified that feelings can be ranged around common centres. To accomplish classification of the feelings by strained efforts can have but one effect—that is, to mislead the judgment in forming a right notion of the nature and end of the feeling in question. But when feelings can be collected around common centres according to their origin and end, their classification contributes to a fuller and clearer understanding of their nature and object.

Two very important feelings—the passion of the sexes and the feeling of right and wrong—cannot be arranged around any common centre ; each one answers a great end, for which it was definitely intended. It is true that other feelings grow out of the exercise of each of these. Out of the former grow confidence and jealousy ; the one when love is in happy exercise, the other when love is disappointed.

With the feeling of right and wrong there are other feelings associated. But this feeling, being the moral part of conscience, remains to be spoken of under that head.

The sympathy of habit is a feeling that exercises a wide influence on man's life ; but it cannot be classed in common with other feelings, unless on the ground of some fanciful resemblance or far-fetched common element. Its end is to render man happy and content in the circumstances in which necessity places him. It is an oil that saves him from a friction that would not only render him very unhappy, but soon destroy his existence. By it man comes to love what at first he does with pain, and, but for the sympathy of habit, the pain would increase. It is thus that the sympathy of habit converts an object of dislike into one of cherished fondness. This is one of the practical wonders of life which pass commonly without any observation. Through this feeling, hard toil becomes a pleasure ; a residence naturally repulsive and unattractive is enjoyed like a paradise, although hated

at first. The end of the feeling is to reconcile man to his lot, both as to his calling and residence; and not only to reconcile him to his labour and residence, but to render him happy with both. But, like every other feeling, it is abused through man's depraved nature. Through it men come to love what is evil, as earnestly as it was intended they should love what is good.

There is the feeling of the sublime, and the feeling of awe, which cannot be classed with any of the preceding. Like other feelings, they answer a certain end for which they were intended. When persons are placed in circumstances favourable for the exercise of these feelings, they cannot help being affected. Their object seems to be to arrest the attention of man, and fix it upon what is lofty, grand, and overwhelming in nature, and to lead man from nature up to nature's God. The exercise of these feelings is agreeable, and therefore contributes to man's happiness. It has a healthy and elevating effect on the mind. It breaks in on the commonplace state of the mind, and shakes it out of its mere grovelling animalism.

Then there are the feelings of harmony and beauty, which exercise a powerful influence on the mind, and one which man cannot resist when placed in circumstances favourable for their exercise. Then there is the feeling of curiosity, which is felt when the mind sees phenomena which are new, but cannot account for them. The design of this feeling is to stimulate man to diligence in the prosecution of knowledge—to lead him to an intelligent investigation of the works with which he is surrounded.

These five last-named feelings, with some others, might form a class by themselves. They are feelings arising out of man's intelligent relationship to the universe, and were intended to urge him on to the cultivation of that relationship, so as to augment his happiness, and advance him in the scale of his existence. Their tendency is to raise him above grovelling, to lead him on to the study of the character and works of Him who has laid the foundations of the earth, and planted the stars in their courses.

CHAPTER VIII.

CONSCIENCE.

SECTION I.

General Remarks.

CONSCIENCE, in the sense in which the term is used, is a compound faculty, and consists of two elements, namely, the feeling of right and wrong, combined with the exercise of the judgment. The feeling of right and wrong is awakened by the exercise of the judgment. The exercise of its influence depends entirely on the judgment. It only goes as far as the judgment goes, and there it stops. The feeling of right and wrong on all moral questions follows in the wake of the judgment. In this respect, the feeling of right and wrong is under the same law as every other feeling, that is, it is awakened by the exercise of the understanding. But the sense in which conscience is used includes both the feeling and the judgment. Nor is this usage an inconvenient one, it is the best for all purposes. Conscience is taken up with the answer to the question, Is it right for me to do this, or is it wrong? Or when the question refers to another, and we are set to judge of its moral character, our conscience is at work, although the question does not concern us, except as judges. But we consider the question as if the case was our own.

SECTION II.

Of the Nature of Conscience.

The relation existing between the feeling of right and wrong and the understanding is the same, and under the same laws, as the relation

existing between the understanding and any other feeling. The measure and variety of feeling with which the human mind is endowed is suited to the circumstances in which man is placed. The design of feeling generally is to give effect to the decisions of the understanding, and in doing so to render man happy. If the decisions of the understanding were always right, this would be the case, provided that feeling would always perform such an office. But this is not so. The understanding is frequently in a state of ignorance, and judges erroneously. Again, it is weak, and wanders from the path of truth; and, in the second place, its just decisions are not always sustained by the power of feeling.

The conscience includes within its province every question of right and wrong, both personal and relative. From our earliest infancy we begin to acquire a notion of what is our own, and what is another's own. The child that has been twelve months at its mother's breast, begins to feel that that breast is its own; and it evidently seems to have some notion that a neighbouring child at some other breast enjoys it as its own. This may clearly be observed by any attentive party who may take note of the movements of the two children. The one will, in most cases, show unmistakable signs of disapprobation on seeing the other intruded on its own mother's breast. It will, in many cases, make sensible signs to put the intruder right by sending it to its own quarters. And as children advance and begin to use toys, the ideas of right and wrong advance, and become more definite and clear. But the question of right and wrong soon becomes complicated, even in childhood. It is intensely interesting to observe at this period, the moral direction imparted to the mind under different systems of training. It is now that the idea of property or privilege develops itself in great variety. It is now that principles good or bad take hold of the mind, and these grow with the development of the man, till in after life they become as indestructible, in most cases, as the soul itself, as far as human agency is concerned. The mind in childhood is soft and tender, and is every day extending its notions of life. Its moral training depends on the conditions in which it is placed. It receives bad principles with the same readiness as good ones. What a child sees others do, it thinks it has a right to do also. This grows with it. Reprove a child for some misconduct, and it replies, in all probability, that such a one did the same. If the example be universal, or even general, among the

child's companions, bad conduct may become as natural to it as good, nor will it feel the least remorse. The reason of this is evident. The notion of property or privilege enlarges only as the child grows and becomes acquainted with the habits of life. At first it only claims its mother and its mother's breast. It becomes attached at a later period to its father; and it will say, and feel it, too, "That is *my* father." As it advances, it learns that this possession of its own is only common property, and that its brothers and sisters have an equal share with itself. To get this conviction requires time, and those who have closely watched the first movements of children need not be told, that in most cases, the conviction is gained after much mental struggle and deep regrets; but it *is* gained, and becomes a rooted conviction. The child about the same time gets a notion of what is due to itself. It feels that it depends on its parents for protection and support. It looks for the enjoyment of this privilege as a right. It becomes convinced about the same time that it is bound to obey its parents, and that they have the privilege of instructing it, and of correcting it when it is in fault, without an appeal to any other party. These gradually become fixed convictions in the mind of every ordinary child in any civilized state. About this age it gets some fixed notion of what is due to its person, although it cannot reason it out, or give an intelligent account of it. But it feels that it has the right of not being hurt or injured by any party, unless it has done some fault. As its mind extends, it soon acquires extended notions of what is due to it. It feels not only that it should not receive bodily injury without some fault on its part, but, still farther, that its reputation should be free from attack. An honourable child shows, at an early period, the keenest resentment against one who tells a lie about it to its parents or some other person. The child's notions of property become fixed about the same age. From its absolute dependence on its parents, and their absolute control over it, it feels that whatever they give it, is its own, and that no one has a right to take it away. Be it some article of food, fruit, money, a toy, or something else, it feels it to be its own absolutely. It acquires fixed notions of property. If its parents are regular and careful in their treatment of the child, it acquires at a very early period notions of truth and falsehood. When its parents tell it that it is about to receive from them some reward or present, it looks for the fulfilment of this promise; and, if its

parents have been truthful with it in past times, it has the fullest confidence in their word.

All these principles and more a child gets firm hold of at an early age. They grow with its nature, and deepen with advancing age.

When these notions of property and privilege are thwarted and trampled on, the youngest child feels that a wrong has been committed. It may not be able so to express it, but it will not fail to exhibit its sense of wrong by its manner. Young as it is, its understanding is at work in passing sentence of disapprobation on that which does not please it. And the feeling of right and wrong is, in its infant play, intense, quick, and fleeting; but this is "the finger of God." The child does not create it; it cannot prevent its exercise. It comes up young and living, and makes the little breast heave with emotion.

In the way of religious instruction the infant will learn anything that the parents may present to it, if they only do so in a consistent and earnest way. If they prove to the child that they are in earnest, the child will be in earnest. This is the natural result of its unbounded confidence in parents whose character is consistent and serious. It drinks in their dogmas as the most certain truth. As it hears nothing contrary it has no choice, and if it had, its kind parents would have every chance to succeed in teaching it any sort of doctrine they might please to inculcate. This religious instruction is entwined with the exercise of affections which can never altogether lose their power. Hence the difficulty of any change in after life of a religious character. This is especially the case where harshness has been exercised by the opposite party towards the parents' sect. As often as the subject presents itself, the spell of parental affection asserts its supremacy, and forbids the understanding to linger one moment in taking a fair view of the question. But it is as a question of conscience that we are to consider this feature of infant training. The religious instruction may be right, or it may be wrong; both will be alike binding as a principle of conscience. The reason is evident. The child believes what its parents teach it, and, instead of becoming less attached to the instruction of its parents as it grows up, it becomes more deepened and confirmed in the faith of its fathers. From the first it becomes to it a matter of conscience; that is, it feels it to be right to do what its parents inculcate, and wrong to neglect or

despise it. Conscience itself thus tends to deepen the child's attachment to the religious instruction of its parents, be that instruction error or truth. The judgment receives it, and the feeling of right and wrong sustains it. Conscience is as strong and earnest in its defence of error, as it is of truth, when that error is received in the way of truthful conviction.

SECTION III.

Early Perception of the Rights of Others.

It will be seen by every one who attentively observes the habits of young children that at a very early age, they acquire some knowledge of what belongs to others, especially children of their own age. An infant observes another infant with an apple or toy. It shows by its manner that the apple is not its own, but belongs to its neighbour. If it happens to get its hand on the apple, it will in many cases freely give it up to its right owner. This is partly the result of training, and partly of natural conviction that it should do so. This notion of the rights of others, grows with the development of the understanding. At first it is confined to the little things of childhood; but by-and-by it extends, and takes in all that one can call his own. The knowledge of the relations of right and wrong is acquired like any other common knowledge. The mind gradually acquires fixed notions of what one may call his own, and the inconvenience of having it taken away, and learns to distinguish the several ways by which it may be taken from the owner. When it is taken away by accident, or some movement of a providential character, the event is regarded as a calamity. When a part of one's property is taken away for some public object, in the benefit of which the owner shares, he acquiesces; but when his property is taken away by one who has no claim on it except through covetousness, he feels that a wrong is done to him. This feeling of right and wrong responds to the exercise of the judgment. The person who feels it cannot restrain it. Like every other feeling, it answers the purpose for which it was intended.

A child feels that what is wrongly done to itself, is wrong when done to another child in similar circumstances. This may be seen by the feeling of sympathy awakened in one child at the sight of

injury inflicted on another. But all that is at work in the mind of the sympathizing child, is the simple exercise of its judgment in discerning the wrong done to its little neighbour, and the feeling of wrong that follows in its own breast on that perception. If it did not perceive that an injury was done, there would be no feeling. When the affliction is chastisement by a parent, the feeling of the child for its little neighbour is sympathy; but when the affliction is malevolent injury done by some illnatured boy, there is awakened in the breast of the child a feeling of disapprobation. It says, in feeling, if not in words, "That conduct is bad, it is wrong." But at this early age much may be done on some other person that is equally wrong, and of more importance, without the child being able to perceive it. In this case it is the fault of the understanding; it is not sufficiently developed to take in the conditions of the case. It is not the fault of the feeling. If the understanding could grasp the circumstances of the case, the feeling of right and wrong would respond.

SECTION IV.

The Conscience, for its Comprehension and Truthfulness, depends on the state of the Understanding; and, for its Power, on the state of the Feeling of Right and Wrong.

If the understanding is ignorant or erroneously informed, the conscience will be defective or erroneous in proportion. If the feeling of right and wrong be weak, the conscience will be impotent in proportion. Let us examine these propositions.

If the understanding be ignorant of some moral or religious duty, it can have no sense whatever of the obligation to perform that duty. The neglect of that duty can bring no remorse of conscience; the existence of the duty is unknown, and therefore conscience has nothing whatever to do with it in either approving or condemning. Many are guilty of slander from ignorance of what slander is; and, instead of conscience condemning them, they have its approval, as if performing a good work, appearing to be zealous in the condemnation of what is wrong in the conduct of others. Thousands, of badly educated persons among ourselves, feel that they are doing a good work when, in a heated strain of severe condemnation, they begin, without the least necessity, to tell over the failings of their

neighbours. This appears to them a good work, provided they say nothing but what is strictly true. They lie down with the conviction that they have performed a service to the interest of public morals; and, the more severely they have criticised and condemned, the more faithfully do they seem to themselves to have performed the somewhat dangerous duty. The example which we quote will be confirmed by every one who has any practical acquaintance with society. In this case, and others of a similar character, conscience says not a word, except it be one of approval. Here the conscience is defective from the ignorance of the understanding. If we suppose one of these slanderers to receive a lesson of instruction on this subject, and to be convinced that the exercise is a bad one, it is clear the party would not repeat the offence again without the reproach of conscience. But in the previous state of ignorance, conscience was defective through the ignorance of the understanding.

Conscience is frequently defective—we should say erroneous, through error of the understanding. Take the case of a young man educated among the Latter-Day Saints, with regard to marriage. His conscience does not accuse him for the act of taking a second or third wife. There is not a trace of disapprobation, more than in the case of the first marriage. But it is well known that such conduct would pain persons of opposite principles, as much as if they had been guilty of seduction, or of some other crime. Here the conscience errs through the error of the understanding. The voice of conscience is the voice of the understanding, but its power is the influence of the feeling of right and wrong. If a child was taught to thief from its infancy up, and if society around it should take the same liberty, conscience in that case would be without a sentence of condemnation. Theft would pass as a legitimate custom, as it was among the Spartans, when cleverly conducted. We have endless examples of the same doctrine, that is, that the voice of conscience is the voice of the understanding, in pronouncing sentence on what is morally right, and what is wrong. We include the religious in the same expression. Numerous cases have occurred of persons having suffered martyrdom in defence of opposite religious doctrines. In such a case conscience is the great ruling power of the soul, but it is very evident that both parties cannot be right.

The sentence of the conscience is the sentence of the understand-

ing; if the understanding be defective, the conscience will be defective; if it be in error, the conscience will be in error.

SECTION V.

The Power of Conscience.

The second defect of conscience is in the want of power. This defect is as common as the preceding one. Persons are everywhere to be met with whose consciences speak to them of what is right, but without any power. Men go deliberately to work the ruin of the innocent and unsuspecting. They know they are about to do grievous wrong, but the thought of it does not pain them. Their understanding is right, but feeling is wanting to sustain its decisions. This feature of moral character may be met with everywhere; it is but too common. Men know when they are guilty of wrong, but do not feel it. In some this want of feeling appears from early childhood. They are selfish and careless of results when affecting only the happiness of others. This feature of character may be seen among boys and girls at school, as well as in the family: one is sensitive and considerate, feeling keenly the circumstances of a young neighbour; another is hard, unfeeling, selfish, and deaf to the claims of associates, if left free to take his own course. This want of feeling of right and wrong, in too many cases, increases as life advances. In some it is otherwise. Again, there are those who were once conscientious, in the common sense of the term, but, through abuse of conscience, lose the power of feeling. They begin with littles, then go on to deeds of importance. Their knowledge of right and wrong remains of course unimpaired. But every repetition of wrong contrary to knowledge, lessens the power of feeling. The man becomes harder and harder, until at last he feels not a pang, unless the apprehension of consequences may disturb his repose. But in that case is it not the feeling of right and wrong that is gone, and, in the majority of cases, gone to return no more? It is important to remark, that this loss of feeling is not limited in its results to the class of conduct under which the guilty party stands nominally charged, its hardening effects extend more or less to the whole man. It does not follow that the delinquent will break through every propriety of life. The power of habit, and the absence of temptation may combine to pre-

serve his moral character under other departments of conduct. But it is not the power of conscientious feeling that upholds him. When that feeling is trifled with and broken down by abuse under one class, it is impaired in connexion with every other. It only requires suitable circumstances to bring out the transgressor as a delinquent under every head of misconduct, as he is under some special one.

This will prove a solution of a great deal of misconduct in the public, which otherwise would appear mysterious. A case may be taken which is one of the most common. A young man has been reared honourably and virtuously under his parents' roof, till he leaves it for business in the metropolis. He gets ensnared by the vice of the streets. At first he feels a deep sense of wrong, both to himself and society. This may prove the means of preparing him to resist the temptation. It has done so in the case of thousands. But if he is not restrained, but goes on, he will soon become hardened, as the history of individual crime testifies. He gets at last to care neither for the shame of it, nor for its moral responsibility. He knows he is doing wrong, but he does not feel the power of that decision of the understanding. He has destroyed in that case his feeling of right and wrong. It ceases to exercise an influence over his conduct. When he began this course of immorality, he did not, perhaps, intend to make any inroad on any other department of his character, as his honesty, &c. But, despite the power of early training, he does not feel shocked at the imaginary commission of crimes as he once would have done. Probably he is only concerned on one point, that is, to keep clear of the law, and maintain his character externally. But most persons that have tried this, learn that it is a difficult task in the absence of a conscientious feeling. The young man has become familiar with the conviction that he is a transgressor against society—a truly terrible and dangerous conviction. This conviction opens up the way to the first crime that presents itself sufficiently backed by temptation. The hope of escape sheds a delusive light on the darkest undertaking. And the absence of a feeling of right and wrong removes the private ballast on the side of virtue. Down goes the scale, and the young man, who once would have trembled at the thought, commits himself by theft, forgery, embezzlement, or some other crime.

The conscience, then, consists of two elements—the judgment and the feeling of right and wrong.

Conscience depends on the state of the understanding, for its comprehension and truthfulness, and on the state of the feeling of right and wrong for its power.

When the understanding is prejudiced, or ignorant of moral truth, the conscience will be erroneous or defective, or both combined. When the feeling of right and wrong has been abused, conscience will be defective in its power.

It may be observed that the great moral outlines of conscience can never be effaced from the understanding. This is established by the lowest state of the heathen. Murder, robbery, and the violation of the female sex, are generally regarded among the heathen as crimes.

CHAPTER IX.

THE WILL.

SECTION I.

General Observations.

IN treating very briefly of the Will, it is essential, in the first place, to glance at the original division of mental action. It is on a right classification of mental action that correct views of the more minute divisions depend.

Nothing has tended so much to obscure the doctrines of the mind as attributing to the mind action which does not exist. The mind thinks, it feels, and in some measure it records its own thinking. This is the sum total of the mind's action. If we add to these three classes of mental action, we thrust into the mind something which should not be there. Like as if some wheel or pinion were foolishly thrust into one of our nicely-constructed engines, turning the whole into confusion and disorder; such is the effect produced in mental science by the efforts of ingenious writers, who have forced into the mind many a wheel and pinion which had no place except in their own imagination.

It has already been proved that there are four elements in feeling. In strong feelings or passions these are more conspicuous. In some feelings the fourth element may be said to be wanting, as it would be subversive of the object aimed at.

These elements are—first, Emotion; second, Desire; third, Joy or Grief; and, fourth, Satiety. We have used the term Emotion, to express the passion or feeling in its first state. It is one thing to feel a passion, as that of anger; it is a second stage to feel the desire

of satisfaction which it produces; it is a third to feel the joy when this satisfaction is realized, or the sorrow of disappointment. Then there is the element of satiety or reaction. As one passion differs from another in its general characteristics, as its effects and objects, so do each of these elements in different passions differ from one another. The joy of one passion has nothing in common with the joy of a second passion, more than the first passion has in common with the second. But this subject has already been treated of, and it is here taken for granted that it is established, and that the principles advanced are conceded as true.

SECTION II.

Of the Nature of the Will.

It is the office of the understanding to deliberate, but the part of the feelings to move to action. When the mind is under the influence of a single feeling, apart from the influence of any other, that feeling will command the whole man as long as it holds undisputed possession. Its influence cannot be counteracted but by a feeling stronger than it.

Take the example of one under the influence of anger. Suppose there is no other feeling to counteract or oppose its influence, it will impel the subject of it to adopt steps in keeping with its desire. There is no exception to this result. Fulfil the supposed conditions, and the result is certain; it will occur as invariably as a stone falls to the ground when left in a position to do so. But let a stronger feeling be opposed to the supposed passion of anger, then there will be an end to its commanding influence; it will cease to control the movements of the man. The passion may still be burning, but it is out of power; its desire ceases to command the services of the man. This counteracting feeling may be any one of a numerous class. It may be the voice of conscience in the strong exercise of its feeling of right and wrong. It may speak to the soul, and say, 'You cannot gratify the bidding of your anger; it is unjust, unmerciful, or cruel.' If the conscience has power, as it has in every right-minded man, there will be an effectual check put on anger. It will be shut in where it may smoke a little, and then die. Or the opposing feeling may be one of fear for impending consequences. If it is sufficiently

powerful, it will restrain the passion of anger, and there will be an end of it. In this case the result will be the same as the preceding one, although very different in moral value.

Or the opposing feeling may be one of pity. The angry man stops and views with pity and compassion the imaginary results of his violent passion. He pauses, stops short, and there is an end of it. The same result is gained as in either of the two preceding cases. As to the moral character of it, it is inferior to the bidding of conscience, but superior, of course, to that of fear, which has no moral merit.

Again, take any one of the three preceding cases, and suppose there is a struggle for mastery between anger on the one side, and conscience on the other; and, after much contention, as is commonly the case in real life, anger gains the ascendancy. Conscience is dethroned, but still makes itself a troublesome complainant; and in proportion the efforts of anger will be weakened. The conduct of the man in his work of redress or revenge will not be so firm or determined as it was in the first case, when there was no voice of conscience or any other feeling. The measure of his energy will be equal only to the difference between the contending feelings.

Again, suppose that conscience gains the victory, and restrains the man in opposition to the voice of anger. In this case the conduct will be in keeping with moral rectitude; but the result will be deficient in energy and determination in proportion as the struggle has been protracted and difficult. This being the case proves the contending feelings nearly equal in power. The result will be weak or strong in proportion as these contending feelings are nearly equal or very unequal. As in the other case, the result will be equal to the difference of the contending moral forces.

But suppose the passion of anger in the case under consideration has no feeling opposed to it. On the contrary, it has some other feeling or feelings whose influence is exerted in the same direction. Suppose the feeling of patriotism is united with that of anger, both impelling the man in the same direction; the resulting energy will be increased in proportion—that is, it will be equal to the sum of both.

If this reasoning be in accordance with the true state of our moral nature, then the following rules of mental action may be deduced:—

1st. When the mind is under the influence of one feeling, no other co-operating or opposing, the resulting effect will be in proportion to the strength of the awakened feeling.

2d. When two or more opposing feelings exert their influence on the mind at one and the same time, the resulting effect will be equal to their difference, and in the direction of the stronger.

3d. When two or more feelings combined exert their joint influence on the mind in the same direction, the effect produced will be equal to their sum.

The sense in which the term "will" is used comprehends these three rules in one expression.

The will, as spoken of in any special act, may be said to be the sum or difference of all the feelings exerting an influence on the mind on that special occasion.

SECTION III.

Objections Answered.

When the mind is under the influence of one feeling alone, then that feeling is the *will*. But some one may say, 'Well, if it is the *will*, why call it *will*? It is in reality only a feeling, and why not name it as such?' To this objection it may be answered that, in a case such as the one supposed above, the name of the feeling is frequently used instead of the *will*; as, "He did it through envy;" "He was impelled by anger." When the feeling is single and prominent, it is generally expressed in this way, without any reference to the will.

When feelings are compounded and complicated, the *will* is more readily spoken of, or rather the term is more freely applied. In such a case the term is absolutely needed. When several feelings exert their influence on the mind at the same time, and that on opposite sides of the question, the resulting mental force cannot be expressed, but by the use of a term such as the will. It is in this case a compound expression.

When several feelings unite on one side of a question, and one or more stand on the opposite side, there is a struggle, and the result is only equal to the difference between the contending sides. To express this resulting moral force, the term *will* is most appro-

priate. It is as convenient as an algebraic quantity in mathematics. In such a case the term is absolutely needed.

When several feelings unite all in one direction, a single term used as an expression for the whole is very convenient. But in this case the term *will* is not so indefinite as in the preceding case, in which several feelings are supposed as exercising their united influence on opposite sides. But in every case the term *will* is a most convenient one, although the name of the feeling is frequently used in the place of it.

But there is another sense in which the term *will* is expressive and important. It will be observed that *will* only expresses so much of the influence of awakened feelings as is exerted in accomplishing the resulting act. In this sense *will* is opposed to every neutralized feeling of the mind. One feels betimes what a struggle he has in his mind for hours between contending feelings. The *will*, however, represents none of those feelings whose influence falls to the ground. On the contrary, the *will* expresses only those feelings, in part or in whole, whose influence results in action, or in holding the subject in some condition, or urging it to the performance of some act.

It may be objected that the definition of *will*, representing it in some cases as consisting wholly of the difference between contending feelings, is fanciful; and the party may ask, 'How can a feeling be divided, with a part given to one and a part to another?' A feeling cannot be divided as we divide an apple, but every one will admit that a feeling has degrees of intensity, and that in one case its influence is twice what it is in another. This admission is all that is needed for the illustration of the question. When two opposite feelings contend for mastery, as it happens in many cases of every-day life, they completely neutralize each other, and there is no resulting action in the direction of either. At another time the resulting action, from two strong feelings opposed, is very weak. Every one knows by consulting his own experience how reluctantly he may have gone to the performance of some undertaking, and all from having had a battle with some opposing feeling. The result has been that of reducing the intensity of the feeling, the reduced state of which ultimately impels him to the contemplated performance. In this case the reduced feeling is practically divided. The opposing one has neutralized a certain part of its energy, and the remainder is all that is left for action. In this case the weaker feeling becomes for the time annihilated, but destroys an equal amount of energy in the stronger

one. This is the case independent of the moral character of the enterprise. In many cases the vigour of the successful feeling suddenly recovers. It is this state of the mind which accounts for a weak and lifeless performance in many cases where the nature of the work is of the most pressing and important character.

There are some cases of an exceptional character, in which, after the struggle is over, the successful feeling seems suddenly to kindle into a flame of intensity, having apparently gathered strength from the contention and opposition of unfriendly feelings. When the undertaking has the approval of conscience, the feeling which sustains it has a tendency to gain strength after a victorious struggle with some unfriendly feeling.

SECTION IV.

Every conscious act that a man does is voluntary, in the philosophic sense of the word.

It is evident to every reflecting mind, that whatever a man does, if he is conscious, he does it by an act of his will. Whatever personal act he commits must be made at the bidding of the will. He cannot move a hand, a foot, an eye, or his tongue without the direct bidding of the will.

One may object and say, but do we not often hear the remark, "I did so and so, but it was not according to my will"? True, this remark is often made, but it is easy to see that it has a special meaning. The meaning of the expression is that the supposed unwilling act is not done in accordance with the general course of conduct, which is in accordance with the will of the person. But the special act itself is an act of the will. A man may be under the influence of a general resolution that he will not drink to excess. This may be the course of life which he wills and which his conscience approves. But some unexpected incident may come in the way, and under its pressing influence he yields and does by repeated acts of his will that which he had determined not to do.

Or again, one may do through fear that which is directly contrary to the general character of his life. But can any one say the act was done contrary to his will? It may be done contrary to what he would have willed had he been free from a feeling of fear. But fear

in this case is the commanding power of the mind. It is in reality the will for the time being. Its power to command the mind depends on its strength. If there is opposed to it a strong, well-rooted feeling of obedience to God, then fear will lose its power, though it should be backed by the tortures of the inquisition.

When an act is done in circumstances which gain it the general appellation of being involuntary, it only means that it is done through the strain of circumstances and is contrary to the general voluntary course of the party's life.

It is the same that is often said of excessive passion, "He did it through passion, it is not a deliberate act of his life." This is merely saying that the stronger passion gained the day. It is saying that the feeling which sustains principle is not as strong in the supposed case as that which arises from some corrupt propensity.

SECTION V.

The Freedom of the Will.

All the difficult questions which have been agitated in past times about the freedom of the will have arisen from a misunderstanding of what the will is. The view entertained of the will attributed to the mind a power which it does not possess. This, as we have observed in another place, is like the insertion of a wheel into some nicely constructed machine, turning the whole into disorder. When the power which impels the mind to action is clearly defined and understood, then mysteries cease to play their imaginary part. The freedom of the will was a mysterious question. There was on one side of a screen, in "darkness that might be felt," a mysterious but mighty personage called the Will; on the other side, in a glimmering, ghastly light, stood a multitude of smaller personages, in the shape of motives, considerations, conditions, feelings, passions, and many more of ominous attributes.

When it is perceived that the commanding feeling for the time being is really the will, then all difficulty about the freedom of the will is at an end. The question at once is seen as it really is—that is, that every man is free or in bondage according as his feelings are right or wrong. If he has cultivated bad feelings till their influence is far in excess of conscience, or any other right feeling, as

that of self-respect, &c., then of course these feelings, as real life testifies, impel him onward in the direction of gratification. His powers of understanding may show him that he is wrong, and feeling to some extent may second their decision; still the man's conduct will be in harmony with his stronger feelings. The man is guilty for obeying their dictates, and especially for the course of immoral training that has issued in that result. A man who has got all his bad passions strong and all his good ones weak, will go in a bad path as naturally as a stone rolls down a hill. His better feelings must be developed into a healthy state before any change of a decided character can take place in his active life. This change of a moral character is sometimes effected by moral means, in the common sense of the word, and sometimes by religious means. This will be treated of more largely in a concluding chapter.

SECTION VI.

The Matter and the Object of Passion in relation to the Will.

The matter or fuel of passion is one thing, its object quite another.

This will be better understood by an example.

A man of revengeful temper gets insulted. His honour, honesty, and perhaps every other good quality are impeached. He reflects on the illnated things which have been said to him. A strong feeling of anger is the result. Here the abuse which has been heaped on him becomes the matter of the passion or feeling. Passion is awakened by thinking and deliberating on the matter. This is passion in its first element, namely, the emotional element. If not suppressed it produces the second element, namely, desire. The party aggrieved seeks to be revenged, and proposes a duel to the offender. The infliction of injury by means of a duel is now the object of the passion. This object is called the motive, because it gives activity, direction, and aim to the passion. It will be seen that the feeling or passion grows out of matter which is generally different from the motive. The matter of the passion gives birth to it, the motive gives it aim. The matter produces passion or feeling in its first element, namely, simple emotion. Emotion if not suppressed is developed into desire, and desire the second element of the feeling

is incited to active measures by the influence of motive. Take another example. A drunkard, by reflection on the scenes of his dissipation, awakens his ungovernable passion for drink. He resolves to throw himself in the way of a drunken associate. He gets off from his work to do so. Here are two parts in connexion with his passion: one is the matter of the passion, that is his course of reflection on forbidden objects; the second is the motive for the gratification of the passion, namely, his going to meet the associate with the hope of a drunken scene. The feeling of uncleanness might be analyzed in the same way. The feeling in general is first produced from some matter which has served as fuel for the passion. Unchecked, it has developed itself into desire with some definite object in view, which then becomes the motive, giving object and aim to the awakened passion.

Or take the case of covetousness. A man, by some bad process of conduct, gets awakened to a dishonest love of gain. This, unchecked, leads him out on some dishonest enterprise. The object of the enterprise becomes the motive of some deed of guilt. But the passion was produced before the motive appeared in view. This distinction kept before the mind is important in forming a right opinion of moral conduct. But it is now considered in relation to the will.

It will be seen from this drift of reasoning, that motive has only to do with passion or feeling in its second element. Therefore, if a feeling is not developed into its second element, desire, it cannot directly form any part of the will. In this case, a feeling falls to the ground without producing any voluntary effect. It gets suppressed in its first element.

The motive or object of the passion is the centre of moral attraction. When the object is gained, it produces the feeling in its third element, namely, joy. If the object is not attained, there is grief, the third element in its state of disappointment.

SECTION VII.

The Determination of the Will.

We have already defined the will to be the sum or difference of all the feelings exerting an influence on the mind at any special time.

As long as the mind is conscious, it is under the influence of some ruling feeling or feelings which constitute the will. But in most cases in which people observe the struggles of the will, there is a fight going on in the mind for position among contending feelings. The stronger feeling, of course, holds possession of the mind. But the question is, what is that which constitutes the stronger feeling? This question might be answered at once by saying that that is always the stronger feeling which gains command of the mind. But the question may be asked, In what does that strength consist, which enables the feeling to command the mind? It has been truly said, that it is easier to ask questions than it is to answer them. And to give an accurate answer to the question proposed is impossible. But there are certain circumstances and conditions upon which the strength of feeling depends.

It is strength of feeling which determines the will, because feeling itself, which impels the mind to action, is the will. Therefore, whatever gives, or tends to give, a certain feeling command of the mind, that determines the will. The determination of the will, as it has been called, is that mental process which causes the will to act in one direction rather than in another. And the consideration which is instrumental in effecting this result was called the *motive*, because it, as it were, moved the mind to action. But the will being considered as a faculty separate from the feelings, involved the question in hopeless obscurity. Such a view failed to give any intelligible account of what passes in every-day life. For if motive determines the will, then it must be its value, importance, or influence which produces this result. That is to say, one motive fails to determine the will when put in opposition to some other which has more influence. Yet the motive which fails to influence one person, is all-powerful in the case of another. How is this result produced, if motive is that which determines the will? The man of vicious propensity feels one motive, as opposed to another, perfectly powerless, and yet he acknowledges the powerless motive to be the more valuable, but it fails to exercise any influence upon him. The same virtuous motive which is powerless in the case of the former, is all powerful in the case of a virtuous man. How, then, can motive be that which determines the will? It is motive which gives direction and aim to the will, but the will is not determined by motive; strength of feeling determines the will. The doctrine, that motive determines the will, deceives the mind

as to the true point of mental struggle. Hence the theory founded on it has always been at war with the living history of human nature, and has failed to account for its perplexing phenomena. It directs the mind, not to the vital point, which is the point of struggle, but to that which is only apparently so. The choice of one motive instead of another, is the effect of the determination of the will, and not the cause. All intelligent men, however different their characters may be, are generally agreed as to the value of motives. Nor is this agreement confined to one class of motives; it embraces all that exercise any prominent influence on human life. But, if it is motive that determines their several wills, how is it that in the real exercise of life, their wills are so directly opposed to one another?

Let us take the case of two men, both perfectly agreed on the value of motives. The one goes in a virtuous path of life; the other in a vicious, the very opposite. But bring them face to face in social conversation, they agree exactly. Nor is their agreement on the value of motives hypocritical on the part of the vicious man. He believes seriously what he declares to his neighbour, namely, that the path of virtue is as far preferable to that of vice, as light is to darkness. If his virtuous neighbour will say to him, "Well, friend, since you agree with me on the value of a virtuous life, why not pursue it?" this query drives the delinquent to the diseased spot in his mental system. It is not a wrong estimate of the value of motives, but the power of an unclean feeling, which he has criminally nursed and cherished till it has gained a mastery over every other better feeling of his nature. This feeling is the will on every occasion on which it expects to be gratified. The motive which gives aim and direction to its desire is the only motive that has any influence.

The man who feels himself the slave of such a feeling does not mend his case by directing his attention to the value of motives, for on that point he feels himself right. The point to which he must direct his efforts of amendment is the dethronement of the dominant feeling. This he must aim at by withholding its food, in the way of meditating on what stirs it up, and guarding against the occasions on which it has proved its power, and especially in cultivating feelings which are opposed to it. This is the ground on which the will is determined, and not in the consideration of motive.

SECTION VIII.

Conditions upon which the Strength of Feeling depends:—First, nearness and convenience of enjoyment; second, excitability of temperament; third, exercise of the feeling in question; and fourth, the comparative strength of opposing feelings.

First, then, we have nearness of enjoyment to consider. The uncertainty which attends the possession of future enjoyment has given birth to a very pithy and common proverb, “A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.” But, leaving out altogether the idea of uncertainty, feeling increases inversely in proportion to its distance from the point of enjoyment,—that is, the less the distance the stronger the feeling, and the greater the distance the less the feeling. That which is felt only as a quiet feeling at the distance of twelve months from enjoyment, becomes a strong passion at the distance of twelve hours, and stronger still as it approaches the hour of enjoyment. One has only to turn his attention to the business of every-day life to be supplied with every variety of example. You may see it exhibited in the happy completion of a marriage contract, as well as in the execution of an unfortunate culprit. The feeling of pleasure and affection, in the one case, swells into a passion on approaching completion; while fear, in the other case, acts in obedience to the same universal law. One may observe the operation of the same law in a popular meeting waiting for the speakers to take their place on the platform. When three or four minutes only remain of expectation, feeling rises into an excited passion till the speakers make their appearance.

All those sudden explosions of passion are accounted for by the same law; such as violence, lust, provocation, &c. The party being face to face with the occasion, there is no longer an interval of separation, and the whole influence of the case is flashed on the mind at once.

Convenience of enjoyment is an important check on nearness of enjoyment. Convenience of enjoyment comprehends the difficulties to be encountered in accomplishing what is aimed at, together with the consequence which the act may involve. Many would gratify feelings of revenge but for the question of convenience. Other passions, equally degrading, would receive every degree of indulgence but for

the same consideration. And if our laws rendered convenience a still more interesting consideration we should have a greatly improved state of morals in some departments compared with what we have. This question of convenience is strikingly illustrated in the case of seduction of persons come of age, and that of those who are under age. The former is so common that it is little noticed, the latter is more rare than murder itself. The reason is evident—the penalty for the former is a mere fine at best, but in the case of the latter, three or four years' penal service. The former would be nearly as rare as the latter if the same punishment was awarded to the seducer. The latter would be as frequent as the former but for the three or four years' penal service—a cheap sacrifice for the protection of society. Murder is of a different character. The violent passions, in many cases, which impel to the commission of this crime, do so irrespective of punishment; if future torment itself was laid open to the eye of the murderer, in some cases it would not deter him,—murders of covetousness may be taken as exceptions. All sorts of seductions are, in general, quietly and deliberately planned, and that without the seduced being able to know it till she is off her guard. If the seducer had the certainty before him of three or four years' penal service, one case would not occur for every thousand at present. Those who might fall into the snare would make a cheap sacrifice for the good of society. The seduced is always by the act ruined for life; and, if the convenience of the deed was fairly balanced by three or four years' penal service, the face of society would undergo an important improvement; the change would be as much a mercy to men as it would be just to women. But this is apart from the subject.

SECTION IX.

Strength of Feeling dependent on Exercise.

Feeling, in its readiness and intensity is greatly modified by exercise. It is by long exercise that certain feelings gain a mastery over the soul, not to be disputed by any opposing feeling. The victim of intemperance feels his down-trodden state in the presence of a feeling, which long indulgence has rendered absolute and irresistible in all that it demands.

Feeling, whether of a good or a bad character, increases in its power by exercise. Howard's philanthropy increased with the increase of his labours and their protracted exercise year after year. Kepler's devotion to astronomical research grew more intense as years rolled on. Alexander's love of conquest so increased with successive victories that he is reported to have wept at the thought of his work being nearly done. Zeal in the service of truth continues to increase the longer it is exercised. The slave of vice becomes more and more helpless the longer that vice is indulged, until, at last, all power of resistance seems at an end. The same sad impulse to sin is felt by the long-exercised thief, who is carried along by the impulse of his covetous nature like a plank in a river. It is this increased power of feeling in bad courses that renders moral reformation so very difficult, as it is known to be in our various reforming institutions.

But that feelings should acquire strength by exercise suited to them is only in keeping with what may be called a universal law. This law the understanding obeys as truly as the feelings. The muscles of the body gather strength in accordance with the same law.

But there is one class of delicate feelings which might at first sight appear an exception. Modesty and self-respect lose their power by much exposure, or by exercise which pains them at first, and then gradually less and less, until at last it is not felt. This is the case, too, with the feeling of right and wrong. When these feelings, however, are exercised in accordance with their nature they increase in power by exercise. It is only when they are thwarted and shocked that their strength suffers.

SECTION X.

Strength of Feeling modified by Excitability.

There is no trait of mental character more strongly marked in one individual as compared with another than that of excitability. One man kindles and swells into a violent passion in circumstances which would not impress another with keen feeling. In most cases the man of sudden passion cools as suddenly, but frequently mischief is done before he gets time to recover himself. This readiness

to kindle into passion is in part the result of defective self-culture, and in part it is constitutional.

It has its good side as well as its bad one, but on the whole it is a defect. The man of strong impulsive feeling is a healthier member of society, than he who inherits the opposite extreme,—the man of cold phlegmatic heart. Women in general are more impressible than men. It is a feature in their moral nature which tells too frequently against their own safety. This trait of character combined with their ignorance of the designs laid in secret against their happiness by the opposite sex, accounts for the sad havoc made by the cruel on the weaker, but finer, and more affectionate portion of society. The elevation and protection of women has always proved the vital test of civilization. Let that department be neglected, and society becomes a rotheap, in spite of many other well-directed efforts to uphold it. Let it be attended to in a spirit of mercy and justice, and society will live and thrive, despite of much that may otherwise be far behind. Society has not reached the point which it is capable of attaining, until the weak are rendered as secure as the strong. The present state of society under this head is very defective.

It is wisdom as well as mercy on the part of the legislation to supply motives sufficiently serious to deter those who otherwise would prey on society. It is as much a mercy to the evildoer as it is to those whom he would injure.

These reflections, however, may be considered as a brief departure from our subject.

It will be seen by every observer of human nature that there is a degree of excitability which subjects its victim to much inconvenience in the business of life. It gives a momentary advantage to the will in the performance of what is afterwards repented of, only when it is too late.

SECTION XI.

The Will modified by the Strength of opposing Feelings.

The will being the sum or difference of all the feelings exercising an influence on the mind at any particular time, includes in a certain sense the proposition now taken for discussion. For if the will is only equal to the difference of contending feelings when such exist in the

mind, then in that case it comprehends in its very existence the doctrine laid down in the proposition. But although this be so the subject does not the less require discussion. It involves a mental principle of great importance—the struggle for victory between opposing feelings. The man who is the slave of some bad passion knows what struggles he has had before falling completely under its power. And even at the worst times the remonstrance of conscience is still felt, however weak. When one feels himself becoming the victim of a bad feeling, it is not enough to struggle directly against it, he must cultivate the feelings which are opposed to it, and thereby neutralize its power. As far as the moral character of the struggle is concerned this is the best means which he can employ for mental discipline. The mind will vent its energy in some direction; if not in a good one, it will be in some one that is bad. He who wishes to discipline his mind must aim at casting out what is bad by introducing what is good. The mental house will not remain tenantless; so long as the good tenant is absent, a bad one will be in possession. And it is only when the good one presses his way in that the bad one gets ejected. This holds good in what is called the mere moral struggle as well as in the religious. The victim of intemperate passion mistakes the mode of fighting the battle when he tries to turn out his tyrannical master and keep the house empty. The only way of expelling bad air from a room is by introducing good air, and the bad makes it escape, no one knows where. So is it with the mind, bad passions can only be turned out by getting good ones in their place: by this means only the old ones get turned out of office.

CHAPTER X.

TASTE.

SECTION I.

Taste analogous to Conscience.

TASTE stands in the same relation to what is becoming, as conscience does to what is right. The laws which govern the one, are of the same nature as those which govern the other. Both depend on the state of the judgment for comprehension and accuracy, and on the state of feeling for power. The exercise of the conscience is about what is right and what is wrong. Taste is engaged in the determination of what is becoming. The feeling of conscience is that of right and wrong, the feeling of taste of what is becoming and unbecoming. For the sake of brevity the one might be called the feeling of right, the other the feeling of becoming. In conscience judgment passes sentence, but it is the feeling of right which gives that sentence power. In taste the judgment gives its decision, but it is the feeling of becoming which makes that decision effective. In both an error of judgment will give an erroneous decision, but that decision will be sustained by feeling as earnestly as if it were right. When the judgment is ignorant, its conclusions are defective or else erroneous. In such a case deficiencies are passed over as if they had no existence. And again that which is right or becoming is pronounced wrong and unbecoming, and that which is wrong and unbecoming is commended. Weakness of judgment gives the same result.

SECTION II.

Examples illustrative of the Principles advanced in Section I.

Taste determines what is becoming time and place, and is pleased

when the object of its inspection is in harmony with its decision. Taste has a place in everything that one does. One way is becoming and another is unbecoming in the doing of everything. Good sense is the foundation of taste and a just apprehension of what is suitable to one's character and position. Taste is pleased with order, consistency, and harmony in all that man does. The work of taste may be said to be the dress which an enlightened reason would put on human conduct. It is pleased with a man being consistent with himself in every part of his behaviour. It aspires to prune man's conduct of the excrescences and eccentricities of barbarous life. Taste is pleased to find a child a child, a youth a youth, and a man a man. It would see a woman not a man, and a man not a woman.

It is pleased to find man's conduct in harmony—the one part in keeping with the other. It would not wear a diamond ring and keep a servant sleeping in a hole not fit for a dog, breathing the air poisoned with the filth expelled from her body. The price of the diamond ring would have paid the workmen for the construction of a healthy apartment. Such conduct places a man on a level with the negro, who sells his neighbour into slavery for some ornament to hang on his degraded person. True taste seeks what is elevating, and shuns what is mean, grovelling, and ignoble. It sees true nobility in the man who paves the streets, and who lives as a working man, cultivates the talents which God has bestowed on him, and aims at preparing his family for happiness and usefulness. It loathes affectation and mimicry. True taste never degrades the dignity of human nature by bestowing more attention on a dog or a bird, than it would on a soul destined for an eternal existence.

Every personal question of taste may resolve itself into one form, namely, what is becoming the querist in the circumstances in which he is placed. The question, in an associated capacity, assumes the same form. The question can only be answered by an exercise of the judgment. One cannot determine whether a thing is consistent with taste or not, unless he has some rule to guide him in his decision. But, whatever be the rule, he can make no use of it, but by the exercise of his judgment. It is evident that if the exercise of judgment on what is becoming, does not awaken a feeling of satisfaction, and if, on the perception of what is unbecoming, there is no feeling of disgust, such a party will take no interest in objects of taste. Whether the rules be right or wrong, there must be rules to

guide the judgment, and that judgment must be sustained by feeling, else it will soon withdraw from its work.

But, according to the principles advanced in the preceding section, the law which regulates the connexion between the judgment and the feeling of becoming, in taste, is the same law which governs the relation of the understanding to the feelings in general. As to the laying down of rules for the guidance of taste, it does not belong to a treatise of this character.

CHAPTER XI.

RETENTION.

SECTION I.

IN order that the present treatise may be condensed as much as possible, a very brief notice is all that can be taken of Retention.

Retention is the third class of mental action. It differs essentially from both thinking and feeling. When we think, we know that we think—we have not to infer it from any effects; and of feeling we are enabled to speak in the same terms. We are conscious and sensible of our feelings. Thinking and feeling are both active, although the one acts and reacts on the other. But retention is always passive. Nor should we have the least consciousness of it but from its effects. It may appear unphilosophic to speak of the effect of passive action, but it is not. We speak of retention as that action which is exercised in the mind when thought is laid up in the mind; it is the mind's capability to retain thought. Some may be disposed to question the propriety of calling it action, as no action is felt, but only inferred from effects. But, if carefully considered, it will be found to possess the nature of action. It is perfected by repeated efforts, and this proves that it has in it the nature of action. If the laying up of thought did not exhibit itself in this way, then retention could not be spoken of as a mental work, but simply the power of the mind to treasure up its own labours. It is thinking and feeling combined that produce the effect. The effect itself we call retention. If the mind is in a healthy state, the effect is lasting in proportion to the singleness and earnestness of thinking combined; that is, thought concentrated on some single object with intense feeling. This is the best condition to produce a lasting impression. The condition is less favourable when thought is compounded and mixed up with several

subjects, however intense the feeling may be. The condition is less favourable still when the thought, though simple and concentrated, is attended with little feeling. A fourth condition, yet more unfavourable than the preceding, is that in which the thoughts are scattered, with little feeling. In such case there is no lasting retention, unless laboriously repeated until the very length of the time itself makes a sort of wayside mark in the consecutive events of the mind.

SECTION II.

Three Conditions essential to the Success of Retention :—First, healthy state of the mind ; second, singleness or simplicity of attention ; and third, an earnest or interested state of feeling.

If the mind is not in a healthy state, the impressions which are made on it are not retained as they otherwise would be. This is known to all who have had the least experience of life. Retention suffers with every attack of bad health, and with every trouble which ruffles and darkens the path of life. The retentive state of the mind changes as readily as the pulse. In the burning heat of fever its strength stands as low as the health of the body. When anxiety darkens the countenance, retention feels the pressure, and its strength suffers in proportion. When the mind is calm, and the health vigorous, retention is in its best condition. In childhood retention is weak in proportion to the weakness and undeveloped state of the body. It is this department of the mind which becomes diseased in lunacy and every other sort of madness, except idiocy. In idiocy all departments of the mind seem to suffer alike. The understanding is paralyzed, feeling is dwarfed and irregular, and retention is equally deficient. But in lunacy retention alone seems to be in fault. Impressions of the imagination pass for real transactions. A mere conception of the imagination is recorded by retention as a reality, and the understanding reasons and acts upon it as such. Every one in a sound state of mind distinguishes between mere imaginary exercise of the mind, and that which is the result of some other faculty of the understanding. A lunatic fails to do this in some department. The impressions of the imagination, the judgment, and perception get jumbled together, and

on certain topics cannot be distinguished the one from the other. This is evidently the fault of the recording process of the mind, or retention. It is not what can be called a weakness of it, for that is only a tendency soon to lose the impressions made, or a difficulty in receiving them. But the mistaking one sort of impression for another, in a way that no mind in its natural state ever mistakes, indicates a state of disease. In severe illness this department of the mind is so much weakened betimes, that it loses nearly all its past impressions, as in violent fevers. Its power returns again with the return of good health.

Simplicity of attention, or singleness of attention, is essential to a successful exercise of retention. If the mind is directed to several things at the same time, it does not retain a distinct impression of each apart, unless it has been familiar with them before. It gets only an impression of the whole as a sort of compound scene,—because the mind can only entertain one subject at once, and if more than one, then the two or three will stand only as one compound whole. If anything is to be well impressed on the mind, the mind must be single in engaging with it. A flickering attention, glancing at this thought and that, leaves a weak, obscure impression, and soon to be lost.

It will be seen by every one that simplicity of attention is of the deepest importance to the success of retention. Thought rapidly divided between this subject and that loses its power, and its half impression is illegible. This is not only an obstacle to what is commonly called memory, but it is extremely injurious in every investigation of the mind. If the mind is not single in its application, the impression is too faint to arrest the mind and fix it on the result of its own reasoning. To use a figurative expression, it strikes a note, but it is too weak to be heard by the ear. That the mind may think effectively, and the impressions rise clear and distinct to view, it must think singly, and gaze deliberately at the object of thought.

It need hardly be observed that intensity of feeling is requisite to the effective exercise of retention. In the absence of this the mind does not become fixed on a single object of thought. Zeal of some sort must be present to keep the understanding engaged; irregular and diffuse thinking is the natural unemployed state of the mind, and to this state it falls back as one of rest. It requires an exertion to keep the mind engaged in any regular exercise of the understanding; but it is felt the less in proportion as it is accompanied

with zeal. It is more by means of such a zeal that the thinking of the mind is single than by any other effort. If zeal be wanting, no effort can, for any considerable time, keep the mind engaged. The thoughts will wander in the very midst of efforts to prevent them doing so. Retention is a failure when thinking is diffuse.

SECTION III.

Memory dependent on Retention.

Retention is the basis of memory ; it is that upon which memory depends. Memory consists of two parts—retention and reflection. The understanding in one of its modes, that of reflection, looks back for past thoughts, these it could not find but for retention. The mind, by its power of retention, has treasured them up to a certain extent ; the understanding, in its exercise of reflection, reads these, as it were, being preserved by retention. Memory will thus appear to be a compound term. It is the compounding of these two departments of the mind which gives us so much variety as we have in memory. One has got a ready memory, yet not remarkable for its strength, either as to retentiveness or the quantity which it can retain ; a second is slow in the exercise of memory, and yet has a strong memory in the sense already indicated. One has got, as it were, to look for what he has laid up in memory ; another gets it by a glance, or does not obtain it at all. This difference depends on the character of the retention, rather than on that of reflection. There is in one mind, in its exercise of memory, a sort of obscurity which compels the individual to gaze on the matter he is in search of before it comes up to view. This the understanding does in reflection ; but, as it has been observed, another sees at once all he can get, although this in quantity is not always equal to the former. This difference of memory will be better understood, by observing a circumstance with which almost everyone is familiar. One may observe that he has sometimes charged his memory with some special trust to be presented on a pre-arranged occasion. When the occasion comes, his memory tells him that it is charged with something which it is unable to produce : this is all that it can give of what was committed to its trust. Reflection goes back into every corner in search of the missing quantity, but cannot find it. Still memory continues

honestly to declare that it received a certain trust; but, like a bankrupt, it cannot discharge its obligations. Retention is in fault; There is a hazy covering concealing the object of search from the eye of reflection, which is eagerly gazing in every direction for it. By this feature of memory, with which almost everyone is conversant, either in his own case or that of his neighbour, may be understood a difference of memory, which distinguishes one from another very strikingly.

There are other differences, chiefly depending on retention, rather than on reflection. In the case of some, retention is very slow in laying up what is committed to it. There is an unusual degree of hardness, if the expression may be used. But in this case, it commonly retains long what it well receives. Then there is the opposite character of retention, namely, a readiness to receive what it loses as quickly. And, again, there is the species of memory that receives quickly and retains permanently what it does receive. This power is but rare, and is the highest character of memory.

SECTION IV.

The Understanding in all its modes dependent on Retention.

The work of memory is to call up thoughts that have passed through the mind at some previous time. It presents these thoughts in the same relation as that in which they originally stood. This is the sense in which memory is commonly used. In a process of reasoning, it is not very usual to speak of the memory as being engaged. Yet without it, the connexion between one term and another could not be perceived. A conclusion, however simple and clear, could not be deduced from premises, but through the service of memory. The same may be said of imagination and invention. The terms which enter into an imaginary picture could not be put together but by the aid of memory. This does not need to be enlarged upon for the sake of bringing conviction to the reader. He has only to observe his own thinking carefully, to be at once convinced of the truth of the proposition under consideration. For in no sort of thinking can two ideas be associated without the aid of retention. The mind can only engage one object at once, and, but for retention, the other would

be totally lost sight of; we mean the idea preceding the one with which the mind is engaged. Therefore, ideas could not be compared; for whilst the mind was laying hold of one, the other ideas which had been present the moment before, would have made their escape, and be lost; and whilst the mind went to look for them, it would lose the one which it last engaged. The idea, or thought, must be kept by retention, or it would be lost. Its effect for a moment would resemble the drop of rain on the surface of the sea; it makes a dimple, and is lost as if it had never fallen. Retention, then, must appear as it is, the basis of all mental action; in its absence there could be no connected thinking, and, in the absence of connected thinking, there could be no mental feeling.

SECTION V.

Consciousness founded on Retention.

A great deal has been written and said about consciousness, and personal identity, of a very indefinite character. Consciousness would not deserve to be called a faculty of the understanding, as that of the judgment, invention, &c., were it not that the custom of language has assigned such a place to it. In most cases, what is spoken of as a work of consciousness is merely an act of memory. One pronounces emphatically that he is conscious he did such and such a thing, which just means that he remembers himself doing it. Again, he says he is conscious he was at such a place, at some certain time specified, which means he remembers himself there on that occasion. But when he says he is conscious of his existence, consciousness is used in a sense different from that of memory. Here it means the understanding taking a view of itself, as a man may view his person with his own eyes. It is the understanding looking at its own operations, still in active progress, and seeing itself clothed with a body, from every sense of which it is constantly receiving reports. And when he speaks of being conscious of any present act or quality, it means that his understanding sees that act or quality as connected with the compound thing which he calls himself, and that, as we have said, is his ever-acting mind clothed with a body. The understanding sees both—the mind by its acts, the body by the report of the senses. The store of items laid up within by the memory, are links which connect it as one whole with

its past history and existence. When one says he is conscious that he saw a certain thing, it means that his understanding can look at it as laid up in his memory; that he received it by the sense of seeing, and could not doubt the truthfulness of the report. It has now become an item of his knowledge which he feels he cannot conceal, even if he would. This is what it is to be conscious of a thing.

The exercise of the understanding in what is called personal identity, is but the exercise of consciousness, as already described. One feels himself to be one with what he was at any preceding period within range of his memory. The records of his memory show him that his *self* then, and his *self* now, are one and the same person. He appears to himself in this view like a traveller. He was at special times on every part of the road, which is his life course. The spot which he now occupies, he is leaving, not to return again. But he carries with him a few associations which, by the help of memory, connect him with parts of the road over which he has passed. In thought he runs back to these, and he has no consciousness of any scene on the road except of such as that to which he can run back in thought, and see himself there, just as he was. Consciousness may thus be seen to be, in one aspect of it, an exercise of memory, and in another, the power of the understanding to review its own work.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PRECEDING THEORY OF THE HUMAN MIND IN HARMONY
WITH THE TEACHING OF SCRIPTURE.

SECTION I.

Introductory Remarks.

IT is an acknowledged difficulty in mental science, that in almost every, if not every system, some of its leading principles are found to be in opposition to the Word of God. If the system and the Bible be in opposition, both cannot be true. The Bible's account of man's moral nature harmonizes with the history of our race. This is an argument in favour of the Bible not to be gainsaid. On the other side, the teaching of our best moral philosophers is at variance with man's moral history. Moral functions are assigned to the conscience which it never performs in its natural state. The teaching of Scripture is opposed to these glowing views of our corrupt nature. It says: "The carnal mind is enmity against God, for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be." (Rom. viii. 7.) Now the carnal mind, as here spoken of, comprehends the whole moral man, and therefore, the conscience. But the declaration of the passage is, that neither conscience nor any other moral power in the mind keeps the law of God, nor indeed, says the writer, can it do so. This is plain speaking. It sets man down in his natural state as he has ever proved himself to be. We have only to turn to Greece and Rome, to discover the character of that morality which man has practised in his best state, apart from the influence of the Gospel. Men have said that conscience is God's vicegerent in man, but God's Word does not say so much, nor does the moral history of man say so much. This would have been true of man's conscience, had man remained perfect; but man is a fallen creature, and his conscience is dark and defiled. Conscience in its lowest state vindicates a few of the great prin-

ciples of man's moral nature, as in case of murder, theft, adultery, violence, &c., but in a very imperfect sense. It is true, however, that man's moral responsibility does not exceed the testimony of his conscience. This is clearly taught in the first three chapters of Amos, as well as in various other passages of Scripture. Some may object, and say that this opinion is not in harmony with Rom. ii. 14, "For when the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law, these having not the law are a law unto themselves." This passage only asserts that the Gentiles did some things right by the testimony of their conscience, and that thus, doing these things by that testimony, it so far became a law to them; that is, God would judge them according to this law. It cannot mean the whole of God's revealed law, for then the same passage affirms that the Gentiles kept it. This would be absurd; because no man has done the things contained in God's law. The passage says the Gentiles do by nature the things contained in the law; that is, they do many things right and just, and their knowledge thus far becomes a law to them.

This is all that the portion comprehends. If some one is disposed to extend its comprehension, and make it mean the moral law in general, this would be absurd by the statement in the passage; for it is said they did the things contained in the law—that is, they kept the moral law, which no man has kept. But if the conscience were God's vicegerent in the natural and unregenerate man, with what propriety could the statement of inspired writ be used which says, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) But if the natural conscience were God's vicegerent in man, it would surely not reject the things of God, and if it did so, it would cease, from that moment, to be God's vicegerent. Again, if the conscience were God's vicegerent, there would be moral light in the soul; but God's Word says, "The entrance of thy Word giveth light." And another portion, "To open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light." But if the conscience were God's vicegerent, this language would not be appropriate. The conscience would make manifest what is wrong, and Scripture says "that whatsoever doth make manifest is light," therefore the state of the soul would be one of light, and not of darkness. The natural conscience, therefore, is not God's vice-

gerent ; it is defiled, so says the first chapter of Titus ; “ Their mind and conscience is defiled.” There is a limited sense in which the term is applicable.

SECTION II.

The Understanding and the Feelings as treated of in Scripture.

Among the ancients the heart was taken to be the seat of feeling. This arose from the heart being most affected by the exercise of strong feeling or passion. The circulation of the blood has its centre in the heart ; and as passion produces a vivid impression on the nerves, the circulation gets disturbed by depression or excitement. The effect produced tells on the action of the heart ; hence the origin of the opinion that the heart was the seat of the affections. Then, by a common figure of speech, the heart itself was put for the affections. This, in the language of Scripture, is more commonly so than in any other book. The following are some of the leading examples :—Prov. xxiii. 26, “ My son, give me thine heart,” meaning, Give thy affections to the Lord ; Matt. xxii. 37, “ Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart,” meaning, with all thy affection ; Jer. xvii. 9, “ The heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked,” that is, the affections are deeply depraved and thoroughly corrupt ; Matt. xv. 19, “ For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications,” &c., meaning, that the depraved affections are the germs or principles of all depraved conduct. And when Scripture speaks of the great work of regeneration by the Spirit of God, it is upon this seat of the affections, put for the affections, that it is said to be performed—as, Ezek. xxxvi. 26, “ A new heart also will I give unto you ;” that is, I will give you new affections ; I will give you feelings of purity and destroy your corrupt ones. Enmity to God, and selfishness and deceit to men, are changed to love, benevolence, and sincerity. In Eph. iv, it is called a putting off of the old man and a putting on of the new. And the corresponding affections of both classes are described in this and the following chapter. In every part of Scripture which treats of this great change, it is spoken of in similar terms.

In the work of regeneration, the understanding is enlightened ; the faculties are unchanged, they remain what they were in capacity. In this respect, the change which takes place in the understanding

differs very much from the change which is worked on the heart. Here the affections are transformed; bad passions are destroyed, and good ones implanted in their stead. The understanding remains essentially what it was. Its state with regard to what is religious is altered; it is enabled to judge truly of that which concerns its present and eternal well-being. It is said in Acts xxvi. 18, "To open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness unto light, and from the power of Satan unto God." *To see* is the exercise of the understanding. Another passage, contained in Psalm cxix. 130, says, "The entrance of thy words giveth light." This expression indicates the means by which the understanding is supplied with light. God's Spirit enables it to see, and the Word is the light in which it does see. There is another passage which says "that with the heart man believeth unto righteousness." (Rom. x. 10.) This passage, at first sight, might appear in opposition to the views expressed with regard to the heart and the understanding. The feelings of enmity and hatred to God being destroyed in the heart, and its feelings of self-sufficiency and self-pride being subdued, the way is opened to the free and unprejudiced exercise of the understanding. Besides, the exercise of faith, which is there spoken of, is as much an exercise of the affections as it is of the understanding. It is so in its trusting, loving depending and clinging to Christ as its Redeemer, mighty to save. In either sense, the expression is in harmony with the views we have put forward.

SECTION III.

The Will as spoken of in Scripture.

The Will in Scripture language is used in the very same sense as we use it at present, and as it has been used in the common language of every people. It is said in Psalm cx., "Thy people shall be willing in the day of thy power." This day of power, taken in connexion with other passages, evidently alludes to the power of God's Spirit in the work of regeneration already spoken of. This day of power is the transformation of the affections. Those that stood on the side of sin are put down, and right feelings gain the ascendancy. A transformation of the will is thus effected. It formerly consisted of corrupt, depraved affections, which held the soul in bondage; but

these are turned out of power, and feelings of purity, humility, and love to God and men take their place. The will, being the feeling or feelings which held the soul in subjection, is now philosophically the same as it was. It is morally changed, having new feelings for its constituted power. But in both cases it acts according to the same mental laws. The same may be said of the other mental departments. They obey the same laws in the renewed mind as in the unrenewed. The exercise of thought awakens feeling, and the most influential feeling constitutes the will for the time being. The understanding always lends its services at the bidding of the will, whether it morally approves what is done or not. The moral change worked by the Spirit on the affections, called a change of heart, has changed in a corresponding degree the whole moral man, outwardly as well as within. If the change does not extend to the life and conduct, there is no change of heart. This is both scripturally and philosophically true. Christ himself says, Matt. xii. 35, "A good man out of the good treasure of the heart bringeth forth good things: and an evil man out of the evil treasure bringeth forth evil things." If the character is not outwardly reformed, there is no inward reformation. There may be the hollow expression of outward purity and consistency, while all within is foul and dark; but if the outward is not consistent, the inward cannot have undergone any saving change. In the work of regeneration, right feelings constitute the will; but a moral struggle is more or less felt, partly arising from the influence of pressing temptation, and partly by neglecting the means calculated to give more complete victory. The believer, accepted through the blood of Christ, and renewed by God's Spirit, may draw freely on the grace of the Spirit if he will. The failure takes place generally by neglecting the appointed means. The case may be compared to that of a youth who feels strong and cheerful, and can discover no signs of failure. This too frequently begets indifference to the means which have produced that state of good health. The result is the means are trifled with, and symptoms of ill health appear. Then it frequently happens, as a second error following from the first, that the mind is not directed to the real cause of the evil, but to something else which does not tell upon it, and the invalid goes on to suffer. In inspired writ the will does not always convey one meaning. The same, however, may be said of the will in common language. In the intercourse of every-day

life, the term is used in different senses. On examination, we find it used only in two senses, nor do we think that it can legitimately be used in any other. These are, first, an active and pre-eminent one; and second, a non-active and subordinate one.

In considering these, it is necessary to refer to our definition of will. In the preceding work we have defined it to be the sum or difference of all the passions and feelings exerting an influence on the mind at any special time. In this we have considered the passion or feeling as a whole. On a more careful examination, it has been found that the will is only concerned directly with the second element of feeling or passion, namely, desire. The double sense in which will is used, both in Scripture and common language, will appear clearly from this view of what constitutes the will. It is not the first element of feeling—namely, emotion—that enters into the compound expression *will*; it is the second, desire. The third element—joy and grief—is but relatively connected with the will, the same as the first element. Desire leads to action when no other feeling is opposed; but when some other feeling is opposed, which is at the same time stronger, the former is restrained in a state of subordination.

This subordinate desire is frequently spoken of as the will when the name is omitted, or rather not applied to that desire which at the same time really constitutes the will. Take a Scripture example:—"Not my will," says Christ in His prayer to the Father, "but thine, be done." The will here is used in the twofold sense referred to. But the term is omitted in the second; it is understood. Christ says, "Not my will;" namely, not my desire for the removal of my pain, "but thine be done." That is, it is my will that thy will be done. The first will is a subordinate feeling, the second, not named, but understood, is the ruling principle of His soul; that is, His desire or will to do His Father's will.

Take an example of every-day life:—One says to his neighbour, who earnestly solicits the loan of a sum of money, "Sir, I am willing to serve you to the utmost of my power, but I cannot advance the sum which you request; I must consult the wants of my family." Here *will* occurs but once in the sentence, yet, in reality, it is used twice; but in the second case it is suppressed, as it always is when similarly used. Will has here its twofold sense, the first inferior and subordinate to the second. It might have been

expressed, "I am willing to serve you, but I am more willing to serve my family." This is understood, and it presents will in the twofold meaning, which is very commonly used. The same ideas could be translated, "I desire to serve you, but I desire still more to serve my family." Here desire expresses the same idea as will, and will as desire.

SECTION IV.

Sanctification.

Sanctification is the development, growth, and perfection of the renewed feelings implanted by the Holy Spirit in the work of regeneration. "Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth," are the words of Christ. (John xvii. 17.) The chief means of sanctification are here expressed, namely, God's word. There are various other means used by the Spirit as instruments for the promotion of this great work. But it is not our object here to discuss or expound them. They first address themselves to the understanding, and through the understanding to the heart or the affections. This is supported by the passage in Matt. xiii. 23, "He that received seed into the good ground is he that heareth the word and understandeth it"; Psalm cxix. 104, "Through thy precepts I get understanding: therefore I hate every false way"; Luke xxiv. 45, "Then opened he their understandings that they might understand the Scriptures." Many other portions might be quoted, but these are sufficient to prove that the means of sanctification as respects the Word are addressed to the understanding, and through the understanding they affect the heart, or the affections. Of course it is under the blessing of God's Spirit that they thus affect the heart. With regard to every other means of sanctification, it might be proved after the same way, that they all address the understanding, and through it they act on the heart. But the heart is the fountain of action; Matt. xv. 19, "For out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries," &c.; Prov. iv. 23, "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life." "Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh." (Matt. xii. 34.)

These and many other portions prove the heart to be the spring

of action. But its action is awakened through the understanding. The understanding receives the instruction and is enlightened, and the affections are thereby called into exercise. There can be no Gospel feeling in the mind till Gospel thoughts make an entrance. We must first hear of the Saviour, before we come to Him; as Scripture says, "How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" Nor can the sinner feel himself condemned till he hear the sentence of condemnation pronounced by God's law. For the Word says, "Where no law is, there is no transgression." That is, the sentence must be pronounced by God's law. But this is in the first place an address to the understanding. There can be no hope without a promise, but the promise must first be comprehended by the understanding before it can be the instrument of hope. We cannot hope for that of which we have no notion.

We have proved already that *will* as used in the Scripture means desire in an active, or in a subordinate sense. But desire is the second element in every feeling or affection; therefore, every feeling as it may be predominant, constitutes the will. Hence, when the affections of the heart are changed in regeneration, the will is changed as a consequence, and acts in conformity to the character of the affections.

SECTION V.

The Conscience.

We have in a preceding chapter defined the conscience to be the exercise of the judgment in the determination of moral questions, combined with a feeling of right and wrong which responds to that exercise of judgment. The term *moral* is used in its widest sense.

Wherever conscience is used in Scripture, it will bear this interpretation. Nor indeed can it receive any other, consistent with sense.

John viii. 9, "And they which heard it being convicted by their own conscience," &c. Now it is evident they could not pass sentence on their own moral state but by an exercise of judgment. And had that exercise of judgment not been accompanied by feeling of guilt, that is, a feeling of right and wrong, they would not have retired from the scene as the passage reports. They first censured

themselves, and a feeling of self-condemnation followed as the result. This is conscience.

Rom. ii. 15, "Which show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the meanwhile accusing or else excusing one another." This passage confirms the view of the last one. There is the same exercise of judgment on their moral state. The passage shows that they were engaged in condemning or acquitting themselves as the case might be. They did this according to their degree of enlightenment.

Acts xxiv. 16, "A conscience void of offence." Here conscience conveys the same meaning. A conscience void of offence, is a conscience that acquits itself of guilt. But this is an act of judgment.

If one entertains wrong principles, the verdict of his conscience will be wrong in proportion. This is clearly established from daily experience, as well as from the testimony of sacred writ. Men often go to the gallows with a clear conscience, because the verdict of that conscience is resting on false principles.

In John xvi. 2, it is said, "Yea, the time cometh, that whosoever killeth you will think that he doeth God service." Here, conscience resting on false principles, acquits the murderer of his guilt. This proves that the conscience depends on the state of the understanding for the character of its decisions. It depends on the state of feeling for its power. This is clearly established from the portion in Rom. i. 21, "When they knew God they glorified him not as God." Here the understanding was not in fault, there was the absence of feeling to give its decisions effect.

In the work of regeneration the conscience is put right. By the change of heart, or the affections, the feeling of right and wrong is restored to power. In the same great work the understanding is enlightened by the entrance of God's Word. These are the two constituents of the conscience. Both are put right in the work of God's Spirit. The moral machinery of the soul is put into healthy working order. The understanding being enlightened corrects the decisions of the conscience, or rather qualifies it for deciding faithfully, and, the feeling of right and wrong being restored to power, gives power and tenderness to the decisions of the conscience. Nor, even in this state of the human mind, can those high-sounding pretensions be applied to the conscience as being God's vicegerent, &c. It is far

from being infallible, for its decisions will still depend on the accuracy of the understanding, and its power will depend on the state of feeling; but both these are imperfect. In proportion to their state of perfection will be the state of the conscience.

This imperfect state of the conscience of a believer is put before us in 1 Cor. viii. 7—"Their conscience being weak is defiled." Here conscience is called weak. This weakness was not a want of power, but resulted from the imperfect state of the understanding, as will appear to those acquainted with the passage.

When conscience is deficient in power it is said to be defiled, as in Titus i. 15.—"But even their mind and conscience is defiled."

The preceding Essay may be read by some who entertain a very inferior conviction of the importance of Christianity, so far as educated persons are concerned. We beg to tell such that this conviction of theirs is one of the gravest mistakes an educated person can be guilty of. It is the Gospel, and the Gospel alone, that can give man a conscience, healthy for himself and safe for society. Nothing but the Gospel can destroy human selfishness. True benevolence, after the example of its great Author, is one of its peculiar features. Every other system has nursed selfishness; the Gospel has destroyed it. Wherever selfishness exists, there the Gospel has not shed its transforming influence. The great unselfish rule for the direction of its followers is,—“Ye know the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through his poverty might be rich.” This exercise of self-denial on the part of its great Author is stamped on the whole system. Wherever it is not exercised, the Gospel, if professed, is but a name. But, in addition to the sacredness of conscience, and the power of benevolence, there is imparted a hope which sheds the happiest influence on all the scenes of life. Can education or rank free the soul from its dark misgivings, or ease the heart of its anguish, at the prospect of dissolving nature? Can they shed a light on the path of the death-stricken traveller as he, trembling, descends the dark valley to the tomb?

Every candid observer must admit that the Gospel has done more for the advancement of civilization, than all other influences put together. Civilization, apart from the influence of the Gospel, moves in a circle, of which the refinement of Greece and Rome may

be taken as one pole, with African degradation as the other. Civilization, under the Gospel, aims at the freedom, elevation, and greatest possible happiness of our whole race. It measures its aspirations by nothing less, and makes steady progress towards the final attainment of an object, which, in its nature, is truly Divine and Godlike.

Neither rank nor education can restore the soul to peace with God. This can only be done through the death of His Son,—“He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life, but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.”

